


064059

JPRS-WER-88-004  
1 FEBRUARY 1988



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

# ***JPRS Report***

# **West Europe**

19980701 046

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

10  
39  
A03

# West Europe

JPRS-WER-88-004

## CONTENTS

1 FEBRUARY 1988

### POLITICAL

#### BELGIUM

- Tindemans on International Issues, European Defense  
*[Leo Tindemans Interview; KNACK, 21 Oct 87]* ..... 1

#### FINLAND

- Koivisto Criticized in Press About 'Communique' ..... 3  
 Foreign Affairs Advisers Attacked *[HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 23 Oct 87]* ..... 3  
 Koivisto Responds to Charges  
*[Mauno Koivisto Interview; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 26 Oct 87]* ..... 4  
 Perestroika Spirit Reaching Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society  
*[Unto Hamalainen; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 25 Oct 87]* ..... 6  
 New 'Komissarov' Article Lauds 'Changed' Conservative Party  
*[HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 13 Nov 87]* ..... 9  
 New Directions Discerned in Green Movement  
*[Anna-Riitta Sippola; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 4 Oct 87]* ..... 11  
 Communist Democratic Alternative Establishes Own Youth Group  
*[HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 4 Oct 87]* ..... 14

#### GREECE

- Disadvantages to Parties From Simple Proportional System  
*[Panos Loukakos; KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 1 Nov 87]* ..... 14

#### ICELAND

- Columnist on Agenda for New Althing, Social Democrat Feud *[MORGUNBLADID, 7 Oct 87]* ..... 15  
 Paper Comments on Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech on Northern Seas  
*[MORGUNBLADID, 4 Oct 87]* ..... 16

#### PORTUGAL

- Parties' Stance on Constitutional Revision Detailed *[O JORNAL, 6 Nov 87]* ..... 17

#### SWEDEN

- VPK Chairman Werner Presents Vision of Communist Sweden  
*[Kenneth Ahlborn, Mats Johansson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 6 Oct 87]* ..... 19  
 Poll: Environment Party Surpasses Center Party ..... 20  
 SDP Continues Slow Decline *[Dick Ljungberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 18 Oct 87]* ..... 20  
 Conservative Party Views Extremists *[Carin Stahlberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 18 Oct 87]* ..... 22  
 Conservatives Gain Three Points *[Sven Svensson; DAGENS NYHETER, 18 Oct 87]* ..... 23  
 Paper Views Contrasting Polls *[DAGENS NYHETER, 18 Oct 87]* ..... 23  
 Center's Internal Struggle Blamed *[DAGENS NYHETER, 19 Oct 87]* ..... 24

### MILITARY

#### DENMARK

- Columnist: Defense Compromise Can Be 'Bought Too Dear'  
*[BERGLINGSKE TIDENDE, 19 Oct 87]* ..... 25

## FINLAND

|   |                                |    |
|---|--------------------------------|----|
| Officials Cite Shortcomings in Civil Defense Alarms, Shelters | [UUSI SUOMI, 21 Oct 87]        | 27 |
| Navy To Purchase English-Made Magnetic Mines                  | [HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 27 Oct 87] | 28 |

## GREECE

|  |                     |    |
|--|---------------------|----|
| U.S. Reportedly Aware of 'New Defense Dogma' Ineffectiveness |                     |    |
| [D. Dimas; I VRADYNI, 9 Nov 87]                              |                     | 28 |
| Chemical Warfare Equipment Purchase Bids Questioned          | [PONDIKI, 6 Nov 87] | 29 |
| PYRKAL Affected by New Billing Scandal                       |                     |    |
| [T. Stamatopoulos, I. Kanoupakis; I VRADYNI, 6 Nov 87]       |                     | 30 |

## PORTUGAL

|  |                               |    |
|--|-------------------------------|----|
| Details on Recent 'Jupiter-87' Air Exercises | [DIARIO DE LISBOA, 31 Oct 87] | 30 |
|--|-------------------------------|----|

## ECONOMIC

### GREECE

|   |                            |    |
|---|----------------------------|----|
| Imports, Exports Rise, Balance of Trade Deficit Grows | [I VRADYNI, 7 Nov 87]      | 32 |
| Drop in Industrial Production Reported                | [I KATHIMERINI, 11 Nov 87] | 32 |

### PORTUGAL

|  |                              |    |
|--|------------------------------|----|
| Figures Show Low Rate of Savings                         | [O DIA, 31 Oct 87]           | 32 |
| January-August Figures Show Export, Trade Deficit Growth | [TEMPO ECONOMICO, 29 Oct 87] | 33 |

### TURKEY

|  |                                      |    |
|--|--------------------------------------|----|
| Money Shortage Halts Work on Urfa Tunnel | [M. Ali Kapakli; TERCUMAN, 5 Oct 87] | 34 |
|--|--------------------------------------|----|

## BELGIUM

### Tindemans on International Issues, European Defense

36140005 Brussels KNACK in Dutch  
21 Oct 87 pp 16-18

[Interview with Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Leo Tindemans by correspondents Sus van Elzen and Marc Reynebeau: "Under Nato's Umbrella"; date, time and place not given; first 3 paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] The smaller a country, the bigger the rest of the world. Foreign Affairs minister Tindemans explains why Belgium's defense is indissolubly bound to the Atlantic pact.

Especially since the appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet Union's strong man, East-West relations seem to have changed. Since then, it has been raining proposals and declarations concerning mutual disarmament, which recently led to an agreement-in-principle to eliminate medium- and short-range missiles in Europe. This affects Belgium as well, given that the Cruise missiles in Florennes also fall under this.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Leo Tindemans (CVP [Christian People's Party]) examines how matters are evolving, starting from the notion that the margins of Belgian foreign policy are not very large. A conversation.

KNACK: Foreign Affairs is a terrain that parliament does not enter into very deeply. Do you find this a good thing?

Tindemans: It is not true that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has less responsibility to parliament. It is impossible to conduct a policy without or against parliament, but we, of course, do not want to approach a government of assemblies where parliament makes all the decisions. I do lament that the confidential nature of parliamentary committees is today no longer defended with the same force as formerly, as a result of which it is becoming more difficult for the minister to speak before the committee in confidence. I am striving to bring about an interaction with parliament. I want to reach a common position with sensible and reasonable members of parliament. For a country like Belgium, it is a point in our favor when people in other countries know that policy is being supported by a considerable parliamentary base.

It does surprise me that, taking the Belgian reality into account, there is so little interest, real interest, for international affairs in Belgium. Foreign policy is not literature, very concrete and real things always accompany it.

KNACK: A not inconsiderable debate has arisen recently concerning a number of military-diplomatic issues, both in parliament and outside of it. There is scarcely any sign of a consensus.

Tindemans: People are of different minds concerning foreign policy and defense policy in modern democracies, not just in Belgium. This dividing line did not exist previously. People should not forget that, fortunately, positions on international policy do not lead directly to consequences; it is entirely different with, say, social security. People can say the biggest nonsense about foreign policy or national defense, and that will not make us at war the next day.

KNACK: How do you view Belgium's role in the international forum?

Tindemans: My policy is, of course, also the expression of a policy of the administration. People very often forget that, since we have been participating in the European Political Cooperation (EPC), we have assumed a responsibility to not defend any position of our own with respect to international policy unless we have made a serious effort to arrive at common position with the 12 EC member-states. And in security policy, Defense also comes into the picture. My first task is to maintain good relations throughout the world. That means that we must try to live together peacefully, but—and this is often forgotten—we also have to look after our own security. As a small country in a world where natural boundaries mean nothing to modern weapons, we also have to seek allies to make this defense credible. Everyone is agreed on these goals, less on the means to attain them. I have to watch over these two aspects. People have called this the Harmel doctrine, but actually it is simply common sense: Do what is needed for security, but at the same time remain open to every serious negotiation in order to keep these security measures as low as possible. That presupposes relations, contacts in defending these positions, along with the allies, wherever we have access to a forum for doing so. Jointly: For alongside reliability and predictability, credibility is an essential element in foreign policy.

KNACK: But haven't you frequently expressed pessimism concerning the effectiveness of the EPC?

Tindemans: Indeed, we have not yet reached the ideal situation, but compared with earlier, there are still signs of progress. You must not forget that, until recently, foreign policy was the most characteristic expression of sovereignty, along with currency which, however, has suffered fatally from international influence. Since the beginning of the seventies, we have been striving to arrive at a joint policy, but before it was unthinkable to even arrive at an exchange of ideas or documents. The EPC can lead to initiatives, if people believe in it and can persuade through arguments.

KNACK: European policy remains divided among diverse institutions: The Commission, the Council, the West European Union (WEU). Is it possible to reach coherence in this manner?

Tindemans: One may, in fact, wonder whether any great cohesion can take place in some fields. Each of the 12 member states is a member of NATO, 7 of us are members of the WEU. In military affairs, this is not a perfect situation. Even though certain countries are also good NATO allies and necessary to the alliance, they still are not members of the WEU. In the matter of foreign policy, however, the differences are as good as nonexistent. There remains only the question of what people will do in concrete cases; for example, with respect to certain countries or in international forums. By and large, however, we adopt about the same position in conflict situations where all 12 are affected, even if this is not directly expressed as on behalf of Europe. And that is extremely difficult. Larger countries sometimes take action independently. Great Britain and France each went to the Gulf alone, almost like major powers. Even in even larger forums than the European one, like the UN Security Council, they sometimes act without consultation. It will take years still before this has disappeared.

KNACK: But doesn't common sense also say that as long as the big countries conduct their own policy, a portion of that policy will be forced upon them by Washington or Moscow?

Tindemans: That depends on the sectors. The trade policy towards Japan and the United States is currently leading to tensions. We are masters of our own fate, the 12 of us conduct a policy together, although we are not always agreed on just how we should conduct ourselves. Large discussions on security in Europe, however, must be conducted with the United States and the Soviet Union. Here, Europe will have look after itself. Thinking that we might be able to do it separately is an illusion.

KNACK: No Europe as a third bloc in East-West relations?

Tindemans: Whoever lived through 1940 could never accept that. In a possible invasion, West Europe would be staved in territorially before it could mobilize. The unoccupied strip would not be deep enough to reorganize the troops and set up a counterattack, as was made clear in the Blitzkrieg. De Gaulle once concentrated troops in Brittany—he obscured that later in his memoirs—and that is now called the “Breton mousetrap” in the handbooks. So, he organized his own downfall, didn't he? As long as West Europe does not have any allies that it can call on for help from overseas, there is no way to provide it with a credible security policy.

KNACK: Unless political.

Tindemans: Yes, but I have always been in favor of Kennedy's formula of equal partnership. The question is only: Do the Europeans really want to be equal, and what are we doing for this? When I hear complaints about the uncertain rate of the dollar, I wonder where the European currency zone has gotten to? Why aren't we doing it? So, we have to scold the Europeans.

KNACK: Isn't the French-German military cooperation an obstacle to further unification?

Tindemans: The idea has grown, in intellectual circles, that we have to occupy ourselves more with our security problems; for example, in the event that the Americans withdraw from Europe. In this context, the French-German cooperation is supposed to form the solid core of a new defense system. Of course, it is a bit baffling that someone like Chancellor Kohl is advancing the idea of a mixed brigade; that is something else, which is not essential to the concept. But what about the others? What about Great Britain? What about the little ones?

KNACK: What, concretely, does this French-German “defense council” mean?

Tindemans: I am not prepared to answer that. Officially, this is not discussed, it remains between themselves. I think, nonetheless, that the French-German military cooperation has already gone much further than we think.

KNACK: You don't believe then in Harmel's idea of bilateral consultation between countries from both blocks, not against but free of the allies?

Tindemans: In a wave of goodwill, Harmel wanted to try to see if it wasn't possible to arrive at a rapprochement, not to disengage oneself from NATO or the Warsaw Pact, but to see if that couldn't serve as a stimulus. What is never said is that Harmel became very disillusioned with this. The occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the end of his efforts. Such initiatives have laid no foundation at all for showing results. The big security policy has to come about jointly with Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. A lot should be able to happen in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in which 35 countries are negotiating together. We have also held exploratory bilateral discussion there, mostly with disillusionment as a result. The outside world has no notion of the strength of the existing bonds.

KNACK: What do you think of a Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals, across the chasm of Yalta?

Tindemans: People are indeed discussing that. We ourselves presented a proposal of sorts concerning the human dimension for implementing the Helsinki final report. There were disillusioning intermediate steps. Even worse, we had to guard against confrontations that would have only worsened the climate. The idea is

growing, but assuming that the defense organisms will disappear because of is something else. For the credibility of defense lies with the alliance.

KNACK: How do you judge the new wind in the east? Do you think that Gorbachev is irreplaceable to it?

Tindemans: We must not forget that in the Soviet Union it is not one man but a system that decides. It is a mistake to personalize. Gorbachev is thus the emanation of a current. At every meeting of the 12 foreign ministers, we analyze the evolution. In foreign policy, you have to make such analyses anew every time, because changes are always possible. What the 12 of us are agreed on is that what is happening in Moscow is more than just propaganda. We have to try to form as correct and objective a picture as possible of just what is happening there, without being all too credulous in the process. Every time we hear this new language, we also have to examine how it translates in the ongoing negotiations, in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, etc.

#### "Control"

KNACK: What do you think of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, a proposal comes from the East, and specifically from the GDR?

Tindemans: We do not find that a felicitous proposal. Now that they are negotiating to find solutions for all of Europe, that proposal is a step backwards. Such weapons are very mobile and can be quickly brought back into such a nuclear-free zone in the event of a conflict. The Shultz-Shevardnadze agreement-in-principle goes much further. Fortunately, it also encompasses the short-range missiles, with which we expected many difficulties, since the Soviet superiority was so great there: 9-to-1. But those weapons cannot reach the Soviet Union, and so we got that in the bargain.

KNACK: And chemical weapons?

Tindemans: We ourselves made a proposal at the UN conference in Geneva: Ban on production and the destruction of stockpiles, and there people on both sides seem to agree. What will be the next step after the missile agreement? Shevardnadze and Shultz have also discussed strategic nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. Things could go very quickly with chemical weapons, if they can find a verification system. Verification of this is very difficult, and we made the offer that such an organ of verification could have its seat in Belgium.

KNACK: Conventional weapons will become a problem of the first magnitude for Europe, once the nuclear arms have been dismantled.

Tindemans: Yes, there are also serious men who believe that we should not conclude an agreement on nuclear arms, because we are in an inferior position with respect to conventional arms. I am still hoping that the negotiations on this will lead to a reduction to a lower level.

KNACK: How does the development of the agreement-in-principle on missiles look?

Tindemans: Signing the agreement-in-principle may take place at the end of this year. According to Vice President Bush, ratification can take place after 2 months, if the will is there. And he didn't believe that the U.S. Senate would oppose it. The missiles will have to be destroyed: The nuclear charge and the electronics would be pulled out, and the device itself processed into scrap. According to Shultz, the SS-20's solid fuel would pose ecological problems. This poses no problem on our side. The Americans think that the destruction will occur over a period of 3 years, while the Soviets think that 5 years are needed. The latter is reasonable, and no trick to postpone the matter.

KNACK: What then, in the most optimistic option, will happen with the Florennes missile base?

Tindemans: Then, the 32 additional missiles will not go there, that is the administration's position. With ratification, a demolition plan will also be set up. How that will look is not altogether certain. We are urging that we definitely not be the last to do this. In the administration, we are currently investigating whether we won't have to make a little law to permit Soviet inspectors in Florennes and Gosselies.

KNACK: In the affairs concerning Helene Pastoors and Ronald van den Bogaert you opted for so-called quiet diplomacy. Is that an efficient policy?

Tindemans: Noise does not impress anyone when you are a small and powerless country. After one day of clamor in the press, no one will be talking about it any more. A minister of foreign affairs who cannot be silent is not worthy of being a minister of foreign affairs.

12507

## FINLAND

### Koivisto Criticized in Press About 'Communique'

**Foreign Affairs Advisers Attacked**  
*36170009b Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT*  
*in Finnish 23 Oct 87 p 12*

[Editorial Roundup: "Other Papers"]

[Text]

### Kalpa Lashes Out At Foreign Ministry

Kunto Kalpa, the pseudonym of a writer for the Center Party's KESKISUOMALAINEN, analyzes the communique negotiations regarding President Mauno Koivisto's visit. Kalpa "considers it evident" that the Finns made an attempt to change the format of the communique.

In Kalpa's opinion, the formulation of neutrality, which is important from Finland's point of view, was weakened in the communique.

"What then was, indeed, attempted? The Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, which has been the subject of an animated debate in recent weeks, and along with it a joint Finnish-Soviet view of what this policy line should contain are completely deleted from the communique.

"As far as is known, an attempt was also made to strengthen characterizations concerning Finland's neutral policy in various different ways. The final result was that not one new proposal was adopted. But the formulation of neutrality included earlier as a counterbalance to the attempt became weaker. But that is the way it is; one must pay for one's stupidity."

Kalpa compares the attempt of the Foreign Ministry's officials, Under-Secretary of State Klaus Tornudd and Political Section Chief Matti Kahiluoto, who conducted the negotiations, with an attempt in the beginning of the 1970s when an attempt was made to give some slack to the Soviet Union's tether. The attempt failed.

"If a change is, indeed, attempted sometime, Finns will have reason to have well thought-out and balanced improvement proposals in their back pocket until the very end. This time, they supposedly did not exist. The most important thing was just to accomplish a change, and the attempt was based more on emotional needs than on rational perceptions."

### Sorsa Raised Suspicions

Kalpa wonders why proposals for a change were even made in general when an explanation was already given after Kalevi Sorsa's speech on Finnish policy.

"According to the information received by Kalpa from various quarters, it is doubtful that any position taken in recent times has been as much of a nuisance as this one. It aroused suspicions in various quarters, undeserved as well as justified.

"Then the action that was taken was most perplexing: on the one hand, it was vowed that there would be no changes, and, on the other hand, in different connections there was an attempt to break with the past even in a childish manner. What seemed to be most important was

that the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line would not be discussed. Since nothing else could be done as far as the communique is concerned, the term was even put in disparaging quotes. Even a small annoyance is still an annoyance.

"Even though the term, Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, would seem however offensive to today's ears, we should, however, admit to ourselves that the term symbolized — as even certain experts have emphasized — something quite significant to the Soviets: good and confidential relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. A rejection of the term can quite easily be interpreted as a rejection of this policy also."

Kalpa points out that after a discussion of the communique, Soviet newspapers printed several articles in which the significance of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was underscored.

### Credibility Wavering

Kunto Kalpa thought that the attempt to introduce a change weakened the credibility of our policy of neutrality.

"The credibility factor also directly affects our security policy. Therefore, prudence has been and will also in the future be the alpha and omega of everything to be contemplated in Finland's foreign policy.

"But international trust in another direction is also of primary importance for a country adhering to Finland's type of neutral policy. The success of our policy is predicated on the fact that there is trust in us. Conditions for this are not necessarily created by these kinds of furtive and unsuccessful attempts, which will become public knowledge, a fact that should, moreover, be known in advance. The circle people in the know is entirely too large."

### Koivisto Responds to Charges

36170009b Helsinki *HELSINGIN SANOMAT*  
in Finnish 26 Oct 87 p 17

[Interview with President Mauno Koivisto by Riitta Snellman on 25 October 1987]

[Text] In President Mauno Koivisto's opinion, Finland's position is not dependent on communiqués issued during state visits. In Koivisto's opinion, it is also possible to renounce communiqués issued between Finland and the Soviet Union. Finland has already previously declined to issue communiqués with other countries.

President Koivisto clarified the debate that arose over a communique issued by him during his visit to the Soviet Union in the beginning of October in an interview on MTV. In Koivisto's opinion, there was nothing dramatic about the communique debate.

In recent weeks, there has been a debate on a communique issued during Koivisto's visit after it became known that Finnish advisers attempted to introduce changes into traditional formulations.

Koivisto compared this fall's communique debate to similar debates in 1970 and 1971. In Koivisto's opinion, the debates were dramatic at that time.

"The trip was especially good, pleasant, and important. And the communique that was approved in connection with the trip was also very good. There was nothing particularly dramatic connected with it and it did not contain any complications. The negotiations regarding the communique were conducted in all its essential elements several weeks before the trip. And it was adopted in one session as far as its political sections were concerned.

"The economic policy section of the communique, however, was still being discussed during the trip. The negotiations on the communique were in the hands of experienced officials as before," said Koivisto.

#### Karjalainen's Communique

Koivisto was also asked his opinion of the article written for KESKISUOMALAINEN by a writer writing under the pseudonym of Kunto Kalpa. Kalpa argued last week that the formulation of Finland's neutrality was made weaker in Koivisto's communique.

Koivisto once again referred to the events of 1970 and 1971. In Koivisto's opinion, the final communique issued by the then Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen (Center Party member) did not weaken Finland's position even though the formulation in it was different than in the communique issued by President Urho Kekkonen in the previous year.

The formulation compiled during Karjalainen's visit is still in use. Koivisto thought that the communique issued during Karjalainen's visit was with the knowledge of President Kekkonen. It has frequently been argued that Karjalainen, who aspired to be president at that time, attempted to "outflank Kekkonen through the Kremlin".

"There was a lot of dramatics connected with those negotiations in 1970 and 1971. As Max Jakobson relates in his book "38. kerros" [38th Floor], mention of Finland as a neutral country was accepted only after Urho Kekkonen threatened to resign from the presidency.

"A year later, the text was changed in connection with Prime Minister Karjalainen's trip. And Max Jakobson is slightly doubtful that it was with Urho Kekkonen's consent. In my opinion, there is no doubt that that formulation which was adopted in 1971 and which is still in use was approved by Urho Kekkonen.

"As far as that period in time is concerned, the major question is whether Finland's position changed in some way when communiqués were compiled under such dramatic conditions and were changed again after a year to talk only about a Finland that practices a neutral policy.

My answer to this is an unambiguous no. Finland's position did not change in any way. Our position is not dependent on the texts of these communiqués."

#### "Rather Poorly Suited"

Koivisto said straight out that communiqués are poorly suited to Finland's system. They are not given official or unofficial treatment in the government. The judicial position of communiqués is also not clear.

Koivisto stated that "within a certain framework" officials have been able to negotiate and agree on a joint text to be published at the conclusion of a visit.

"Many more general problems, one of which is that they tend to be too long, are connected with these communiqués. The other problem is that the Soviet Union has worldwide interests and our interests are more limited. The third problem is that since we have exchanged visits rather frequently and communiqués are a necessary element, we would prefer not to repeat previous communiqués word for word.

"And there is yet another point of view which must be taken into consideration and that is that these communiqués are rather poorly suited to our state system. For example, when agreements were signed in Moscow, they were signed by ministers who had received their authority in Finland from the President of the Republic during the presentation to the Council of State. Moreover, these communiqués are not treated officially or unofficially in any college of officials. Thus their whole judicial status is, to some degree, problematical."

#### Communiqués Can Be Renounced

Koivisto would even be ready to entirely renounce the communiqués issued during his visit to the Soviet Union.

[Question] Would it be possible that these communiqués could be renounced?

[Answer] Yes, it would be possible. We have abandoned the practice of issuing communiqués with all other countries. As I have said, we have not had any particular difficulties with the Soviet Union. And we did not have any this time either.

Koivisto also wondered out loud why joint communiqués include phrases which neither side really ever uses. "There is yet another peculiarity in the practice of issuing communiqués and that is the use of phrases



which the Soviet Union does not use. Indeed, we sometimes talk about our country as a country that practices a neutral policy. For example, when I delivered the dinner speech in the Kremlin, I talked about Finland as a neutral country. It is a somewhat peculiar situation that Finland's position is defined in the communique with words that neither side uses. Or only one side uses and even this is only on occasion.

#### Absolution for Officials

In his own article Kunto Kalpa wondered at the skills of the officials who conducted the negotiations regarding the communique. Koivisto gave the assurance that the officials performed their work "successfully". The negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Ministry's Under-Secretary of State Klaus Tornudd and Political Section Chief Matti Kahiluoto.

Koivisto also talked about the leaks to the press with respect to the negotiations. After Koivisto's visit, HELSINGIN SANOMAT published information on the negotiations on 12 October 1987, in which the Finns attempted to delete from the final communique the traditional definition of Finland's foreign policy line, which has been included in all such communiqués since 1971.

It was decided in the discussions held in Moscow just before Koivisto's trip that Finland's foreign policy, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact, and Finland's desire to carry out a peaceful policy of neutrality will be included in the communique in a matter-of-fact manner as before. As far as is known, this was the demand or wish of the Soviet negotiators.

"Herein lies a rather exceptional chain of events since quite a few editors in Finland knew about the course of the discussion. And they found out about it a month ago already. But they have not yet said from whom they obtained the information."

Koivisto has advised the editors who published this information to reveal their source.

"It would be correct and appropriate that those Finnish editors who were in the know relate the background of their information. Then I will later say what went on. Even my information is second or third hand. I should make certain that the information which has reached me is substantiated and correct."

#### Perestroika Spirit Reaching Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society

36170009a Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT  
in Finnish 25 Oct 87 p B 6

[Article by Unto Hamalainen: "Friendship Society in Clutches of Perestroika, Moscow's Reform Pace Causes Aging Finnish-Soviet Society To Become Breathless"]

[Text] Severe creaking and squeaking can be heard from the wheels of the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society. Many old doctrines have been thrown on the scrap heap in the USSR, and since more openness and efficiency are being demanded in everything in Moscow, the same is being demanded of cooperation with neighbors.

"We cannot keep up with perestroika [reform] and glasnost [openness]," complain activists in the SNS [Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society]. They have become aware that the society must also reform itself.

There will be turmoil in the SNS this fall. A congress will elect a new leadership for the society at the end of November. An attempt will be made at the same time to reform the society's operating procedures. The SNS's rank and file is presently conducting a debate on future direction.

In addition to the rank and file, party secretaries are also concerned about the friendship society. While the rank and file feels a sincere concern for the society, the interest of the parties is primarily political avarice. Since the society's leadership positions are up for grabs, the party secretaries have been calculating power relationships throughout the fall. The new patterns of government policy are having an effect: the SDP and the Conservative Party are demanding a more visible position in the society's leadership. The leaders of the ruling parties are also critical of the society's methods.

Indeed, the Center Party and the Communists admit deficiencies, but they are not willing to accept changes in leadership positions. They fear that there will be an attempted takeover under the guise of a reform policy.

The activists among the rank and file have been annoyed by the game being played by the party secretaries. The SNS office even sent a membership dues notice to Ulpu Iivari, secretary of the Social Democratic Party.

The Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society is afflicted by the same organizational diseases as the political parties, trade unions, and other large organizations. The reports and development programs compiled by the leadership tell of an internal anguish. The organization is large, 90,000 dues paying members belong to it. Only a small portion actively participates in its activities. Such a large organization needs a large machinery, the operation of which entirely employs activists.

All those working in the society admit that the organization continues to be maintained by the Communists and the People's Democrats. They arrange functions, sell lottery tickets, and procure subscriptions to newspapers. If members of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] were to leave the society, there would be nothing left of it. Only the more experienced organizational people from other factions join and immediately demand leadership posts as a reward for their self-sacrifice.

The society is burdened by an old tradition, which is not easily discarded. In past years, the society energetically railed against anti-Soviet phenomena. The positions taken by the society also frequently included flattery directed toward the USSR, which has aroused repugnance among Finns. The society was labelled as a super-vising Big Brother.

The friendship society and its partner in Moscow, the Soviet-Finnish Society, have been the filter of Soviet relations. The societies arrange visits, trips, cultural exchanges, and youth cooperation.

When Finnish organizations made trips in the past and wanted to meet Soviets, the SNS's stamp of approval on the banner helped in arranging many matters in Moscow. But now Finns want to manage affairs directly without an intermediary. Assistance is wanted in arranging cooperation, but guardians are not needed.

The SNS has disseminated "correct and reliable information" about conditions in the neighboring country to the Finns according to its own words. At one time, the SNS was an important channel of information since it was otherwise difficult to obtain information from the USSR.

Now things are different. Information transmitted from the USSR by the friendship society cannot help but bring up the rear. The USSR is digging into its affairs so openly that every day there are enough headlines even for Finnish newspapers. The anti-Soviet phenomena avoided by the SNS have withered away to a meaningless fizzle since the Soviet leadership is being so outspoken in its housecleaning.

They have begun to reform communication, but exchange visits and Soviet information are lagging behind. The bottlenecks are in Helsinki and Moscow. The leadership is being renewed in Moscow also: General Secretary Yuri Zotikov, who has managed Finnish affairs for a long time, has retired.

#### **Ossified Forms Being Reformed**

The expression of a sense of reform and speaking straight out are not as easy as it would appear from the outside. The society's activists complain that there is no ability to discuss things in the society. Difficult issues are not discussed.

This is apparent even in the society's leadership. The Central Executive Committee requested Ulla-Liisa Heino, a translator of Russian books, to evaluate cultural activity. Heino did not pull any punches and initiated an extensive debate. The final debate bubbled over with ideas.

In conclusion the chairman thanked Heino. "It is good that we wash our dirty linen in private and not just praise things and continue the same line. This speech would provide the society's critics with ammunition anywhere other than here at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee."

A couple weeks later, the whole society was shocked when Deputy Director Georgiy Fedyashin of the Soviet news agency APN ["Novosti" Press Agency], declared at a press conference in Helsinki that the MAILMA JA ME newspaper, which disseminates Soviet information and is published jointly by the society and APN, has not kept up with perestroika. Fedyashin predicted that the society's meeting will be critical.

Ilkka Lappalainen, the chief Finnish editor of MAILMA JA ME, categorically refuted the allegation. "Not one refreshing and bold article from the Moscow editorial staff written in the spirit of perestroika and opening up new directions has remained unpublished. On the other hand, some articles written by the Helsinki editorial staff in the spirit of perestroika have been criticized by quarters in Moscow," shot off Lappalainen.

The discussion was cut short. The office of the SNS announced that the whole controversy was the result of an error in translation. But the telephone at the office of MAILMA JA ME rang for several days because people aroused by the debate ordered new subscriptions.

Yevgeniy Zheleznov, the newspaper's Soviet deputy chief editor, is leaving Helsinki. He will be replaced by APN Editor Yuri Spilyov from Moscow.

The society has been able to reform the old ossified operational procedures of cultural exchanges, travel, and sports as well as youth cooperation. "Small services have been offered in place of big words," is the description given of the new line.

The society's book company boldly established a bookstore in the center of Helsinki in the fall and began marketing its products by modern means.

Many passers-by could not believe their eyes when they saw in the window of the bookstore among the Soviet books Lasse Lehtinen's amusing book about Finns' acts of stupidity committed in the bureaucratic labyrinth of Soviet trade. Taboos were also broken by the fact that Chingiz Aitmatov, Viivi Luik, and Yevgeniy Yevtushenko have been included in the society's book orders.

In addition to official youth cooperation, the society has also arranged the first events for average youth. A group of 150 young people is leaving for Moscow today. Rosa Liksom and the Sielun veljet [Soul Brothers] rock band, among others, are presenting Finnish youth culture. The hosts are the new top names in Soviet rock groups.

The society's leadership awakened from its slumber when a study of anti-Soviet opinions among youth was published last year. Instead of waving a blackboard pointer, the society implemented a Familiarization With Our Neighbor project, by which Soviet videos were procured for the schools. This does not seem like a peculiar achievement, but it has required great efforts in a prejudiced bureaucracy in both countries.

### Society's Elderly Leadership

The friendship society's leadership continues to be dominated by the "pioneering generation", which has enlightened the people about the wisdom of Eastern relations throughout the entire history of the society. "All respect to the veterans, but it is now time to step aside," it is being said.

Reforms would already have progressed much further in the opinion of many if the society had dared to bring in a younger generation 4 years ago.

The practical work of the society is directed by a chairmanship. It includes as chairman Councillor of State Martti Miettunen, 80, as well as vice-chairmen: General Manager Erkki Aho, 50, Municipal Councillor Inkeri Airola, 71, Governor Paavo Aitio, 69, General Secretary Toivo Karvonen, 82, Chancellery Councillor Vaino Kaukonen, 76, and Ministerial Councillor Matti Kekkonen, 59. The chairmanship also includes SNS General Secretary Erkki Kivimaki, 64. After the congress, only Kivimaki will continue in the chairmanship.

A 52-member Central Executive Committee and an even broader council will be elected at the congress. The committee and the council do not have much significance in day-to-day work, but each position in the mutual pecking order of the parties is weighed with an assessor's scale.

The Communists hold a full one-third of the positions in the Central Executive Committee. The Social Democrats and Center Party members also have strong positions. In addition to the nonaligned and Swedish People's Party members, there is one Conservative Party member, Prime Minister Harri Holkeri, as an ornament.

No major changes will occur among the parties. The Communists do not want to give up their positions, which are now for the first time being distributed even officially between two communist parties. The SDP and the Center Party will not give up any positions either so that a second position for the Conservative Party will be snatched from the quota of the nonaligned. Holkeri is

also being offered a position in the chairmanship being vacated by Vaino Kaukonen. The Conservative Party is not demanding anything more since the bourgeoisie does not exert itself in the area of the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society.

There are more than 50 employees, of whom 34 are political secretaries, on the payroll of the friendship society in the central office and in its districts. Other factions criticize the political distribution of officials and employees. Since the majority of the society's activists is comprised of Communists, the majority of paid employees is from the same group. The SDP has three secretaries and the Center Party has two in the central office.

Also a new general secretary will be sought for the society in the near future. The election of General Secretary Erkki Kivimaki caused a minor fuss at the time since the Soviets announced that the SKP's candidate, Erkki Kauppi, chief editor of KANSAN UUTISET, is not suitable for the job. The Taistoites [Stalinists] also endorsed Kivimaki.

Even though Kivimaki initially acquired the derisive nickname "Dead Weight", he has straightened out or quietly buried old unsuccessful projects. The Kuhmois Motel, which has operated in the red for years, has been sold, and the travel business has been rationalized. Kivimaki is considered to be a suitable man for the interim, but a younger leader, who would, of course, be a Communist, is needed in the future.

Politics affects the choices also for the reason that the leadership of the SNS has a kind of "semi-official" position in Soviet relations. President Mauno Koivisto was elected the society's honorary chairman at the beginning of his term in the manner of his predecessors. The chairman and general secretary of the SNS were included in the group accompanying him on his state visit to the Soviet Union. It is also an old custom that the society's general secretary visits the presidential palace several times a year to relate the latest news of the society. Koivisto is quite interested in it since he was a member of the society's leadership in the 1960s.

The society has its own liaison in the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, Estonian-born cultural councillor Johannes Johansson.

The choices also interest the government for the reason that the state supports the society with significant subsidies, which are of a completely different class than support for other friendship organizations. Next year's budget proposal includes almost 9.2 million markkas in subsidies for the society. The society receives assistance for salaries, retirement payments, overall expenses, and maintenance of the Lenin Museum.

Parliament will increase appropriations even more. A 150,000-markka subsidy for the Familiarization With Our Neighbor project was inadvertently left out of the

budget proposal. The state also comes to the aid of the office's temporary shortages. STS Bank, the landlord of the society's central office, is ejecting its tenant. The state will buy, renovate, and rent the premises to the society.

The ministers raised their eyebrows when the society first demanded that the state purchase the premises for its use. The purchase was considered to be an excessively severe demand — renting has been an established procedure of the state, and the government did not want to make an exception. The question of space was a sensitive matter. The previous government put it off for its successor. After passing the buck, the matter was turned over to Chancellery Minister Ilkka Kanerva. Kanerva was forced to tell the society's leadership that the premises will be rented and not donated.

The society is also supported by many businesses conducting trade with the East. These firms are corporate members of the society. Askö, EKA, Finnair, Lassila & Tikanoja, Nokia, Perusyhtymä, Rautaruukki, Rakennus-Ruola, the Tapiola Companies, and Valio, among others, are members.

Both Finnish and Soviet economists want to see perestroika implemented in the friendship societies. In their opinion, the societies should give direct aid in arranging relations and not be satisfied with hosting routine seminars.

### Two Candidates for Chairman

The selection of a chairman will be resolved well before the congress. There are two candidates. The Center Party has unconditionally demanded that Oulu Provincial Governor Ahti Pekkala, 62, be elected to the post. The Social Democrats have surprisingly proposed Managing Director Erkki Aho of the National Board of Education.

Preparation seminars, at which opinions will be heard, will be held in several districts over the weekend. The Policy Committee [Politburo] of the Finnish Communist Party will have its say next Wednesday. It will mean a lot since two-thirds of the representatives coming to the friendship society's congress will be Communists.

It has also been rumored that there will be greetings from the Soviet Union. The Center Party's SUOMENMAA has already stated that Pekkala's candidacy "met with understanding" in Moscow during the president's state visit. "No decrees have been issued," is the assurance coming from the society.

Ahti Pekkala's chairmanship is being justified by continuity. He is the last of the men on top of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. Pekkala has worked in the society's Oulu District, but not in the central leadership. No one seems to have anything to say against Pekkala. He is known

from way back as a conscientious man capable of cooperation. Pekkala's minuses are his remote place of residence and the fact that he is on the verge of retirement.

Erkki Aho's supporters are marketing their man as an effective representative of the new generation, who has also won his spurs in the society. Aho is also considered to be a reasonable man, who is capable of cooperation and who has also earned a reputation as an enthusiastic supporter of the study of Russian language.

The growing power of the Social Democrats in foreign policy organizations, is outstripping the other parties, even the Conservative Party, which otherwise keeps up with the Social Democrats. There are Social Democrats in the leadership of the Paasikivi Society, STETE, which promotes security and cooperation, and the Foreign Policy Research Foundation. Jaakko Iloniemi directs the society and the foundation and Pertti Paasio directs the STETE-committee. Iloniemi is actually resigning from the leadership of the research foundation.

If the Communists do not take a tough negative stand against Pekkala, he will be elected. It is doubtful that the Center Party will humble itself to change candidates even though other names in the Center Party have been mentioned. "The position will be given to someone from the Center Party. In a bourgeois Finland, the bourgeoisie must also have a visible place in foreign policy," admits a leading Social Democrat.

Also the society's honorary chairman, the President of the Republic, has indirectly indicated that he has nothing against the election of Pekkala.

The society's new leadership will be faced with a true ordeal by fire after the congress. A week in April of next year has been set aside for a visit to Finland by party leader Mikhail Gorbachev. If the visit becomes a reality, a reformed SNS must be able to show its mettle. Gorbachev is interested in the Finns, and the friendship society should be able to make the emerging Gorbachevism a driving force in its own activities also.

10576

### New 'Komissarov' Article Lauds 'Changed' Conservative Party

36170021a Helsinki *HELSINGIN SANOMAT*  
in Finnish 13 Nov 87 p 15

[Text] Juri Komissarov Analyzes Conservative Party. 'Holkeri's Cabinet Platform Proves Change in Conservative Party.'

In careful terms, the Soviet author using the pseudonym Juri Komissarov has expressed his opinion on the entry of the Conservative Party into the cabinet. Komissarov has expressed his opinion in his article in ULKOPOLI-TIIKKA [Foreign Policy], a journal published by the Foreign Policy Institute.

In his article Komissarov assures that the Soviet Union does not intend to interfere with Finland's decisions on domestic and foreign policy issues. He believes that interfering with Finland's internal affairs would be in conflict with the principle of peaceful coexistence.

"The Soviet Union does not intend to interfere with Finland's sovereign decisions concerning domestic and foreign policy issues. Such interference would be in conflict with the principle of peaceful coexistence and would indicate a vote of non-confidence to the Finns and their leaders' ability to act so as to protect their own interests while taking into consideration the interests of their good neighbor, the Soviet Union."

In Komissarov's opinion, the Soviet Union's attitude toward the forming of the cabinet last spring was an indication of the Soviet Union's consistency. After more than twenty years in opposition, the Conservative Party entered into the cabinet.

"A confirmation of the consistency of such policy was, for example, the attitude toward Finland's new cabinet formed in the spring of 1987, which, instead of consisting of the leftwing and center parties, was formed under the leadership of Harri Holkeri and included the Conservative Party."

According to the writer of the article, the cabinet's platform is an indication of a change in the Conservative Party.

"An indication of the evolution in this party, which has a long history of having frowned upon the friendly relations with the Soviet Union, is also the cabinet's platform, which emphasizes the intention to continue Finland's current foreign policy and to develop the relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance."

Until now, the Soviets have not expressed their opinions so precisely on the cabinet formed last spring. Immediately after the cabinet had been formed, Juri Derjabin, a long-term expert on Finnish affairs in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said that a cabinet which is good for the Finns is good for the Soviet Union. In Finland, Derjabin has been suspected of being the writer Komissarov.

#### Changed Policy

The author using pseudonym Juri Komissarov has written about Finland's affairs for well over ten years. Komissarov publishes a few articles every year in Finnish papers and magazines. In his book LINJA [Policy], which came out a couple of years ago, Komissarov also discussed the Conservative Party. At that time, Komissarov's attitude towards the party was suspicious.

"Quite significant forces, which have not given up their efforts to change the country's foreign policy, have retained their influence in the Conservative Party," Komissarov said in the spring of 1985.

Komissarov suspected that after the electoral defeat in the parliamentary elections of 1983 the Conservative Party would have turned more to the right. "After the Conservative Party failed in its attempts to enter into the cabinet after the parliamentary elections of 1983, there are strengthening opinions that 'a more distinct right-wing profile' should be returned to the party's platform," which does not exclude making similar changes also when establishing the party's platform on foreign policy issues."

In his book LINJA, Komissarov considered the cooperation of the communists, the social-democrats and the center parties a guarantee of consistent foreign policy.

#### Acknowledgement to Presidents

Finland's presidents after the war are praised by Komissarov. J. K. Paasikivi is praised for "the removal of the burden of prejudices" and Urho Kekkonen is called "the architect of the policy of trust." Mauno Koivisto is praised for continuing the policy of his predecessors.

Komissarov reminds us that in the Soviet Union "even the very term Paasikivi-Kekkonen policy and particularly its most important points have always been associated with the policy of friendship, trust and cooperation in regard to our country and to the active attempt to promote international security."

While praising the good relations between the two neighbors, Komissarov reminds us that problems might emerge as well. Crisis situations must be prevented. The writer suspects that there are attempts on the outside to poison the relations between the neighbors.

"Of course several people in the west and some even in Finland would like to 'fix' the relations between the Soviet Union and Finland and the country's entire foreign policy. For example, there are strong efforts to make the general public believe that the Kekkonen era is gone and that greater independence, becoming more European, is now needed in the foreign policy," says Komissarov.

The writer also takes up the discussion on the role of V. I. Lenin in the process of Finland's independence. Some Finnish researchers have suspected that Lenin's acknowledgement of Finland's independence was a tactical move. According to Komissarov, Lenin acted based on principle, not based on expediency.

**New Directions Discerned in Green Movement**  
*36170001d Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT*  
*in Finnish 4 Oct 87 p B 7*

[Article by Anna-Riitta Sippola: "Green Movement's New Directions"]

[Text] The Green movement is like a squabbling new family, which does not know how it should organize its life. The father and his adult sons are at loggerheads with each other, and the father does not understand why his advice is not respected. The women groan about the eternal positions of men. The children who are fed up with the continuous bickering pack their bags and leave home to see the world. The mother is ready to become a working housewife. To outsiders the family says that things are now better than ever before. Life's bruises and the ridicule from neighbors force them to build walls of happiness.

Last spring's elections were a tough test for the Greens. Opinion polls over the years had lulled the Greens into the belief that parliamentary seats would come easily. Many celebrity Greens even declined to become a candidate since they, indeed, feared that they might actually become an MP. Only four parliamentary seats were forthcoming, two more than before. This was considered to be nearly a crushing defeat. The voting percentage remained at four while the opinion polls had indicated a support rating of 9—10 percent.

The Greens are gradually recovering from their election depression. A possible major victory was lost in many communities by the nomination of inferior candidates, mutual conflicts, and by the fact that there was no will or desire to sell the candidates to the voters. "The general comment during the elections was that you do not advertise, thus you are not serious, and thus there is no reason to vote for you," recalls MP Pekka Haavisto. Haavisto won a seat in parliament after making his face known in television's great election debate.

The Greens voluntarily decided to skip next winter's presidential elections.

Election fatigue and a shortage of money have once again released talk about a green party. It appears certain that a green party will be established in Finland before the 1991 parliamentary elections.

The argument for becoming organized is that only a registered party receives a party subsidy. The amount depends on the number of MP's.

A definite majority opposed the establishment of a party at a meeting of the Greens in Tampere a year ago. It was decided, instead, to form a Green League as a mouthpiece and to bring different trends of thought together. Nothing has been heard from the league.

The MP's and many other important Greens are now for the formation of a party. They believe that the issue will no longer cause as great a stir as before. There are other opinions also.

"If the party is established, a third of the Greens will remain outside of it," predicts Ulla Anttila from Vantaa. She would like to postpone talk about a party at least until next fall's municipal elections. In Anttila's opinion, it would be tactless to ignore the results of the party debate in Tampere.

"The formation of a party could drive people away, but the present system also drives people away," notes MP Osmo Soiniavaara. He does not believe that there will be much of an argument over a party in Green circles.

"If a party debate must be held again, it is better now than just before the elections," hopes Pekka Haavisto. He says that he has become gradually persuaded to the idea that money will be procured through a party. "Although it is in a way a kind of extortion that only a registered party, which is controlled by a formal law, can receive money."

"Write this: Day-to-day life has demonstrated that a party should have been established a year ago already," said MP Eero Paloheimo bitterly.

Above all, he wants all possible party support. If there were a party, the Greens' four-member parliamentary group would receive 8 million markkas during this election term, calculates Paloheimo. "It is sheer stupidity to reject this."

In Paloheimo's opinion, the money could be used to provide incentive for actions, pay part-time secretaries for projects, to plan, to prepare...

Money is a weak argument for a party in Ulla Anttila's opinion. Other reasons should carry more weight. The formation of a party could freeze some of the other activities of the Greens, she fears.

Heidi Hautala, a long-term Green from Helsinki, recognizes the importance of money: in her opinion, "operating on a basis of mere interest seems to be an excessive challenge".

Haavisto hopes that Paloheimo would not form a party alone. Naturally, there is the danger of dissension since everyone does not approve of a party, admits Haavisto. Dissension or division, however, would in his opinion be a sign that the movement's cause has not been thoroughly thought out and that the Greens are not sufficiently strong to carry it forward.

### **Paloheimo Wants Credibility in Greens' Actions**

Paloheimo criticizes the work of the Greens as being weak, slow, and fruitless. In his opinion, the Greens have this election term to demonstrate that they are a credible group. "Ten years ago, Green and environmental thinking in Finland were in some respects at the peak of development in Europe. Now it appears that we have been standing still."

According to Paloheimo, the Greens will salvage their credibility with a clear national program and organization. As a carrot to a party's opponents he also offers space in the party's organs and on the election lists for those who are not organized or independents.

According to Paloheimo, the parliamentary group must show that it is thinking over a longer term and along greater lines than the other groups and is not bogged down in day-to-day politics.

Green women raised quite a fuss in the spring when only men were elected to parliament. One should not become bogged down in this kind of an annoyance in Ulla Anttila's opinion. She, however, criticizes the parliamentary group for the fact that it has not yet extended a hand to the Green rank and file, people have not been included in projects. The composition of the group may feed the traditional thinking that the MP's will promote our causes and we ourselves do not have to do anything, she thinks.

The Green movement has been exceptional for different cliques and personality conflicts since its inception. The problem is not merely Finnish, consoles Heidi Hautala. "At a meeting of Greens in Stockholm it was pointed out that in every country the Greens are predisposed to splinter groups and cliques. It was wonderful to hear stories that the prevailing reasons for separatism even elsewhere are the result of personal relationships, and conflicts regarding issues have remained unaddressed because of them."

In Soininvaara's opinion, the Green rank and file do not quarrel, but he admits that a certain distrust lies between some "important Greens".

Relations between Soininvaara and Paloheimo are poor in the opinion of some people since two roosters cannot rule the same roost.

### **Movement Has No Machinery in Which Support of Differing Views Would Be Clarified**

In Hautala's opinion, the Greens' quarrelsome image has been supported by the fact that the movement lacks a machinery in which support for differing opinions could be measured. Opinions that are clearly in the minority are never dropped from discussions since it is never confirmed that they do not have actual acceptance, he says.

Many label Green feminists as the nest of distrust. The women have been aggravated by the fact that middle-age men are heard the most among the Greens.

Paloheimo knows his enemy. Most recently in the spring he infuriated many by labelling those Greens who concerned themselves with social policy as fumbler and by hoping those interested in changing the political form would leave the room.

Now he divides the Greens into four groups. First are the idealists, who do not have any political ambitions, but who will perhaps sacrifice a good career to become involved. The second group is made up of those who are aspiring to a political career, the third is comprised of those interested in new political forms or those who want to conduct politics without a party.

Perhaps the largest group is made of those who are dissatisfied with present conditions and who "see hope in the Greens in some kind of a self-outlined, indefinite manner". If this group had to compile a program for the Greens, it would not know how to do it, says Paloheimo.

Paloheimo is not pleased with the three latter groups.

The Greens should consider what they actually look like from the outside, says Heidi Hautala.

The Greens have not known how to channel favorable attitudes to their own benefit. In Hautala's opinion, it is not at all self-evident that "the extraordinary favorable attitude and sympathy" experienced initially toward the Greens will continue. "Now would be the time to find out."

"It has come to mind that we would be in need of some kind of outside advice. There is no shame in this, all political movements spend vast resources on this in order to determine the kind of image they present to the outside."

According to Hautala's experience, there are many people who are only waiting for an opportunity to be included in the activities of the Greens. "We have not been able to do anything for them except list the seven ideological member organizations of the Green League, of which perhaps none are operating in the community of the person inquiring."

She believes that the Greens are gradually beginning to comprehend the destructiveness of divisiveness. "Now the Greens are beginning to be rather unanimous about the fact that common issues must be found in order that the movement does not waste its opportunities."

### Proponents of the Millennium, Pragmatists, and Proponents of Chaos

Jukka Kanerva, a researcher from Jyvaskyla, divides the Greens into three castes. The key to the division is time.

Kanerva has been involved in the activities of the Greens himself. Now he, however, says he is wearing the hat of a social scientist.

"Individuals holding a perspective of eternity or Greens believing in the millennium became active at the time of the earth's geological age. The time perspective of the Linkolas and Paloheimos moves in hundreds and thousands of years. However, ideas cannot become political programs. They do not hold up in practical politics.

"The time frame of the pragmatists and reformists is 5—50 years. Thus the Soininvaaras and Haavistos operate as individuals with a view of eternity but at a more realistic level.

"The third group is made of people promoting chaos or squatters and dreamers, those whose premise is the here and now: one coup and it is a fait accompli."

The proponents of chaos are the Greens' grass roots level, without whom there would not even be a movement, says Kanerva. His heart is clearly inclined toward the proponents of chaos.

"It is difficult to talk about the Greens as a unified political movement. The Greens have a common will with respect to broad questions, such as 'nature cannot be polluted'. However, politics cannot be made on this basis only."

The Greens are bound by a common *no* to the Finnish state and to its manner of existence, says Kanerva. "There really is no common yes."

"The pragmatists, naturally, hold the power as in all political movements." Kanerva once again returns to Paloheimo and ties him to the pragmatists in addition to the utopians.

Ville Komsa is a definite proponent of chaos. Komsa's career as an MP was both a comedy and a tragedy, says Kanerva.

"Historic periods of transition always create such movements," explains Kanerva.

In Kanerva's opinion, there have been no hurrahs in the Greens' political appearances. There have been thousand dollar spots, but they were not used, and no new ones are forthcoming.

"In the 1983 elections the style was not to vote unless you were aware. The elections were a failure."

### Green Ideology Will Remain a Movement of the Urban Intelligentsia

If society continues on its previous course or if there are no economic or other upheavals, the Greens will remain only a marginal group, predicts Kanerva. Support will stop at 10—15 percent. "The importance of the Greens may be greater in the Helsinki Municipal Council at the most.

"The Green movement is and will remain a movement of the urban intelligentsia. It will not make any inroads in rural areas into Centrist-Laestadian soil."

The very young do not really care for the Greens. "The Greens do not have much to say there where *Coke Is the Real Thing*."

Kanerva explains the results of the last elections, which the Greens consider to be a defeat, by the prevalence of Green ideology. The voter can find enough suitable "Greens" from the other parties that there is not much of a need for the Green movement itself.

Kanerva mentions Jorn Donner (Swedish People's Party member) as an example. He is a "moral critic and a product of city culture, who breaks down conventional barriers, a typical urban Green in Helsinki".

Finland's political system is exceptionally absorbent, says Kanerva. "The system takes control of those becoming involved in political activities and uses them as its own tool. Some of the Green's ideas are realized, some not. In this way the movement will little by little become merged with the rest of the political field.

"Just as the radicals of the 1960s: they now wear pinstripe suits to work in government offices.

"A political movement must be able to publicly show its entire scale of thought in 10 years. After that, it becomes mere routine. One cannot last more than two election terms by means of sheer novelty."

Kanerva believes that there will be a green party in the 1991 parliamentary elections. But a normal registered party, which will qualify for a party subsidy, is complete nonsense, says Kanerva angrily. "The Greens cannot be that stupid!

"This would be foolish from the point of view of image. If the Greens want to isolate themselves, this weakest form of party organization should be avoided even with the price that there would be less seats in parliament than by means of a normal organization."



**Communist Democratic Alternative Establishes Own Youth Group**

36170001b Helsinki *HELSINGIN SANOMAT*  
in Finnish 4 Oct 87 p A 8

[Article: "Democratic Alternative Youth Form Own Group in Oulu"]

[Text] Oulu—Democratic Alternative youth are leaving the joint youth organization formed with the majority and are establishing their own Revolutionary Youth League.

A couple hundred youth, who met in Oulu, assembled on Saturday to discuss the goals of their organization. An election of leaders will be conducted on Sunday and a resolution is promised.

According to those planning the formation, the SDNL [Finnish Democratic Youth League], led by the majority Communists, "has acted in an indefinite manner for too long".

"It has been clear ever since the conflict in the party that something had to be done for youth work also. Northern Oulu is a good place to meet. Kainuu and Lapland have been active provinces since the split."

It was announced by the youth that the formation of their own youth organization has been considered for approximately a year. The work accomplished during that time has resulted in an organ called the council of red youth. At the same time, Deva youth have published the eighth edition of their own newspaper.

10576

**GREECE**

**Disadvantages to Parties From Simple Proportional System**

35210025c Athens *KYRIAKATIKI*  
*ELEVTHEROTYPIA* in Greek 1 Nov 87 p 48

[Commentary by Panos Loukakos: "Who Would Benefit From the Simple Proportional System Now? The Pro's and Con's for PASOK, ND, KKE"]

[Text] A unanimity on the voting system rare in Greece is the primary characteristic of recent political developments. A position in favor of the simple proportional voting system has been taken by all the parties and minor parties of the left. A position in favor of the simple proportional has been taken by parties and minor parties between PASOK and ND. The introduction of the simple proportional is also accepted by the leader of the official opposition, Konstandinos Mitsotakis. And, finally, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou has abandoned his original position that the voting system should not be

changed and is already discussing the possibility of altering it, with KKE General Secretary Kharilaos Florakis the privileged partner in these talks of course.

Thus there is general agreement or abstention on the question of introducing the simple proportional system. And the natural question which arises is relatively simple:

How is it possible for the simple proportional system to benefit everybody? How is it possible for the interests of PASOK, New Democracy, KKE, DIANA, EAR [Greek Left], and all the other parties and minor parties to coincide on the common denominator of the voting law? Is nobody harmed by the simple proportional system?

Let us begin with New Democracy. Certain recent polls show it clearly leading PASOK. Its president and many of its leaders are unshakably convinced that it will win the next elections. Therefore doing away with today's reinforced proportional system is not in its interest. It is not in its interest because if ND actually did come in first in the coming elections, it would have an absolute majority in Parliament under the current voting law. In contrast, it is logically impossible for the simple proportional system to give ND an absolute majority.

Above and beyond this, however, the simple proportional system favors party splintering. And today the party facing the greatest problem of this type is New Democracy. Under the current voting law anybody leaving the party will return sooner or later as elections approach, and naturally those remaining in the party will not even think of deserting it. Under the simple proportional system, on the other hand, the flow of those returning to the party's embrace would dry up and there might in fact be a tendency in the other direction.

For these reasons the simple proportional system does not benefit New Democracy. In an attempt at a tactical diversion, Mitsotakis accepted it so as to join with KKE in totally isolating PASOK politically. However, after Andreas Papandreou's sudden turnabout on the issue of the voting law, the whole scene was transformed. In this way the president of ND was caught in the very trap he had prepared for Andreas Papandreou and now of course it will be difficult for him to escape.

It is clear then that the simple proportional system is contrary to the interests of New Democracy and even clearer that Mitsotakis has lost yet another round in his struggle against Papandreou, who is now discussing in principle the possibility of modifying the voting law. But why does PASOK not explicitly reject the simple proportional system today?

Obviously because its leaders have now accepted the fact that the party is passing through a period of grave crisis and clear decline in its voting strength. Under current conditions and the current voting law, it would come as a great surprise to everybody if in the coming elections

PASOK won an independent majority for another 4 years. According to plausible forecasts, under the reinforced proportional system, PASOK is likely to have no role to play in the government after the next elections. On the other hand, if the simple proportional system were introduced, PASOK might well play the central role in developments after the election, being able to choose its partners in the government. If to this is added the fact that A. Papandreou, in contrast to Mitsotakis, is in complete control of his party and faces no tendencies toward splintering, then the picture is complete: Yes, under current conditions, the simple proportional system benefits PASOK absolutely, as in the previous two elections the reinforced proportional system benefited it.

For KKE, finally, the issue is far more complex. A positive point for KKE is that under the simple proportional system it would almost triple its number of seats in Parliament. But there are also negative points to the whole question.

It is possible that the next elections, if held under the simple proportional system, would produce a correlation of forces making the Communist Party the arbiter of the political scene. Inasmuch as cooperation with New Democracy can be ruled out for obvious reasons, KKE would find itself in the unpleasant situation of having to decide whether or not to support or join a PASOK government. However, since KKE's positions on the central issues of foreign policy—EEC, NATO, American bases, etc.—and on the main economic issues are fixed and since PASOK's diametrically opposed positions on those same issues are even more fixed, the question arises of what form this postelection cooperation might take. And in that case Kh. Florakis would find himself with far more deputies but also with far greater problems.

And what of the smaller parties which today are so enthusiastically in favor of the simple proportional system, considering it a panacea guaranteeing their survival? Some people seem to forget here that the voting law is not enough; votes, too, are needed to elect deputies. And even if the next election is held under the simple proportional system, it will be polarizing in nature since it will form the continuation of a clearly polarized political scene.

In view of all this, then, A. Papandreou's move to open the simple proportional question is anything but strange. Once again K. Mitsotakis has fallen into the very trap he had prepared for Papandreou. And does Kh. Florakis fully understand the adventures he will be setting out on if the simple proportional system is in the end adopted?

## ICELAND

### Columnist on Agenda for New Althing, Social Democrat Feud

36260003b Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic  
7 Oct 87 p 9

[Commentary by 'Staksteinar']

[Text] The Althing of Iceland, the nation's one-hundred-and-tenth legislative assembly, will open session over the weekend. Today's 'Staksteinar' column talks a little bit about that, and about the shifting of power in our society. We will also take a look into the pages of ALTHYDUBLADID, where criticism of the government, particularly of the Social Democrat ministers, has appeared: something new, for that newspaper.

### Government's First Hundred Days

The government of Thorsteinn Pálsson, a coalition of the Independence Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Progressive Party, recently passed the hundred-day mark. "The honeymoon is over, and now things will have to get serious," Thrainn Hallgrímsson said in an evaluation of national issues in yesterday's ALTHYDUBLADID. There just might be some truth in that.

The government has presumably utilized the summer months to prepare governmental proposals, particularly economic and loan budget proposals for the coming year, which will be presented before the new Althing which will be meeting over the weekend. Government policy will be delineated in these as well as in the other governmental proposals which will see the light of day in the first weeks of this parliamentary session.

In democratic and parliamentary nations, the governmental opposition has a particularly significant role to play. This role is not primarily that of government policy critic, though we would not want to underestimate the importance of that auxiliary function. The opposition should, rather, present a clear and well-defined voting alternative, or alternatives, on the chief issues tackled by the parliament, including its own presentations of proposals and suggestions for parliamentary decisions, so that we can obtain clear comparisons of the various proposed solutions on issues which affect our welfare and our future. Criticism alone, without a clear presentation of solutions other than those the government offers, ends up, more often than not, "dead and hollow."

### "Ushered in a New Era of Inflation"

The nationally elected Althing and the government, which was supported by a narrow parliamentary margin, wields, as is well known, extensive power. Moreover, its power and influence extend even further than that, particularly in the labor and professional organizations. We should remember the fact that the leftist government of Hermann Jónsson requested resignation 4 December

1958 because the national organization of labor unions thwarted that government's wishes to postpone a seven-point increase in the consumer price index, in connection with anti-inflationary measures. Concerning that occurrence, Agnar Kl. Jonsson wrote in his book *Icelandic Government Policy*:

"The prime minister wrote a letter on this matter to the national union organization, and then came to their convention (the labor unions' convention) on 28 November and further explained all the ramifications of the issue. This attempt did not produce the desired results, since it came about that the union organization, for its part, voted down the request of the prime minister for postponement. The prime minister then called for a meeting of the ministers on the morning of 29 November, but agreement was not reached there concerning support of the proposal. The result of this was that the new consumer price index came into effect at the beginning of December, thereby ushering in a new era of inflation. Since there was nothing else for it, Hermann Jonsson decided to request resignation for himself and the ministry on 4 December 1958.

#### Criticism for Both Jons

There was criticism in yesterday's *ALTHYDUBLADID* directed against the two Social Democratic Party ministers, Jon Sigurdsson and Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson.

On the front page of the paper, it was indicated that there had been arguments at a meeting of the League of Young Egalitarians as to "whether the minister of commerce, Jon Sigurdsson, had opposed the Fisheries Bank of Iceland's sale of national treasury shares. In the outline made of the meeting's policy decisions, the minister of commerce's position on the issue was lamented. . ."

Thrainn Hallgrímsson writes, in an article on national issues in the same newspaper, that it is "not at all consistent with Social Democratic traditions in political involvement" to raise taxes on food. "And I find the explanations of the Social Democratic leadership in this matter worthless," says Hallgrímsson. He says further: "Whatever rationalizations they have for their decision to tax the food services of our educational institutions, it remains an obscure riddle to me."

*ALTHYDUBLADID* seems to be taking on the role of independent critic, even when "the party" is the object of the criticism. We will be watching to see how the two Jons respond to this.

9584

#### Paper Comments on Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech on Northern Seas

36260003a Reykjavik *MORGUNBLADID* in Icelandic  
4 Oct 87 p 28

[Text] After a seven-week absence, Mikhail Gorbachev made a recent appearance in the north, in Murmansk, where he delivered a speech in which he presented a

series of six proposals. "As I stand here in Murmansk, on the threshold of the Arctic and the northern Atlantic Ocean, [I would like to] invite those who govern over these areas to discuss matters of security which have been pressing for some time now," the Soviet leader said, previous to presenting these proposals. According to him, the proposals are aimed at creating a zone of peace in the northern hemisphere. (Shouldn't all parts of the earth be zones of peace?)

First he proposed a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. He said that the Soviet Union was prepared to bear the responsibility for this, and that they had unilaterally dismantled the launchpads for midrange missiles on the Kola Peninsula. Second, he praised the proposal made by the president of Finland, Mauno Koivisto, concerning limits on military operations at sea in the northern European area. Thirdly, he said that the Soviet Union places great value on peaceful cooperation towards utilization of natural resources in the polar area. Fourthly, he called for a 1988 conference involving all nations with authority over the polar regions, to coordinate scientific research. Fifthly, he called for cooperation in environmental protection in the northern regions. Sixthly, he said that the seaways north of the Soviet Union, stretching from Europe to the Pacific, should be held open for foreign ships by a team of Soviet icebreakers, if developments in international relations would permit it.

These proposals are nothing new in themselves. The ideas are old, and have often been discussed before; some in this decade, such as the nuclear-free zone. What is new is that the Soviet leader should emphasize these matters to such a degree. This could be interpreted to mean that northern issues have come to have more significance in Soviet policy. In July 1986 Gorbachev traveled to Vladivostok, on the Pacific Ocean, and gave a policy speech on Asian and Pacific issues. Since that time, government authorities and specialists have examined every word in that speech, in order to get a handle on the new Soviet policy relative to those regions of the world. The Murmansk policy speech is like that. We will have to watch and listen to what Soviet government spokespersons and specialists make of the speech before all of it will become clear to us.

Leonid Brezhnev, Gorbachev's predecessor, tried in his day to push the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries. When attempts were made at this, it became clear that the idea would have to be interpreted so narrowly that it would in fact change nothing. Right now there is a working committee of diplomats from the foreign ministries of all the Nordic countries discussing a nuclear-free zone. There is no doubt that this committee will be examining and evaluating what the Soviet leader has said about this issue in Murmansk. Concerning the limitation of military operations at sea, discussions have already been held in the arena of the United Nations and within the framework of the conference on security and

cooperation in Europe. Regardless of Gorbachev's speech, these issues should have gotten on the agenda in disarmament negotiations rather earlier than later.

After Gorbachev gave his speech in the harbor city of Vladivostok—not far from China, Korea and Japan—it became obvious that the Soviets might be trying to re-establish their image as a Pacific power, which the Pacific nations will have to take notice of. By traveling to the harbor city of Murmansk—not far from the borders of Finland, Sweden and Norway—and delivering there a speech on the northern regions, Gorbachev is reminding our neighbors in these areas of the power and influence of the Soviet Union. By looking to the north, Gorbachev is saying that the Soviet Union is no less a power there than it is in the Pacific.

Naturally we should receive Gorbachev's proposals with some reservations. In the northern regions, as in other places, mutual benefit ought to be the ruling principle in disarmament issues. There are no nuclear weapons in any of the Nordic countries; that fact was recognized by Gorbachev in his speech. The lack of nuclear weapons in these countries should not mean that the Soviets have any right to intervene in their security policy. If it becomes obvious on closer investigation that Gorbachev's superpower proposals are aimed at this, then these proposals ought to be denounced. The Soviet Union is a superpower constantly grasping about for more acquisitions, in the east, west and north; it has even made military attack across its southern border, into Afghanistan. We should always bear this fact in mind, when we examine the speeches of Soviet authorities.

9584

## PORTUGAL

### Parties' Stance on Constitutional Revision Detailed

35420024 *Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese*  
6 Nov 87 pp 8-9

[Text] During a time of constitutional revision it can well be said that sometimes the most difficult task is that of smoothing out the rough edges and forging agreements between people. Tomorrow (Saturday) is the day for finalizing plans. The party leaders shall convene the national councils and commissions from the respective parties. Squabbles and the airing of well-kept secrets are anticipated.

At what point do plans become similar, coincide, become disparate?

Which parties would like to alter the structure of the revision? Maintain or eliminate the references to agricultural reform? Establish procedures for constructive censure? Limit or expand the powers of the President of the Republic? These were some of the questions we posed to the parties, as can be seen in the table below.

It was not easy to obtain responses. We could not even avoid leaving blank the column of answers referring to the PRD. Despite the great deal of openness and goodwill exhibited by the leadership of that party, we found it impossible to contact whoever was responsible for drafting plans for the revision.

There were also, in the case of the PS, those who surrounded their proposals in a "wall of silence" which, with some difficulty, we succeeded in penetrating (the defensive attitude of the PS, which does not want to reveal its tactics, must be understood), but we also recognize those who gave us prompt responses, such as the PSD, the PCP and the CDS.

### Structure

PSD: No response.

PS: Changes in some respects.

PCP: Complete respect for the structure of the current (and successive) revisions. Any deformation of the essential identity of the democratic regime would make the revision law unconstitutional.

PRD:

CDS: The revision law cannot specifically threaten the independence and unity of the State.

### Number of Deputies (Method of Election)

PSD: One hundred ninety to 200 deputies, 150 of which shall be elected by local districts, with the other 50 through national elections, which would benefit the parties most widely voted.

PS: Maintain the 250 and the Hondt proportional method.

PCP: No reduction: this would alienate the voters from the deputies, distorting the proportional representation (and serving to encourage the artificial perpetuation of the PSD in power). The system of proportional representation, through the current Hondt method, has proven adequate for representation of national political reality, without significant distortions.

PRD:

CDS: Between 200 and 210. Proportional representation without detriment to the creation of single party districts.

### Emigrant Vote

PSD: Permitted for presidential elections.

PS: Not acceptable for presidential elections.

PCP: The results of the presidential elections should be an expression of the electoral will of freely educated citizens, which implies liberty and equality of campaigning, financial and voting conditions.

PRD:

CDS: Permitted for presidential elections.

#### **Ideology**

PSD: The objective of "assuring the transition to Socialism," as well as the "socializing" and "socialist" expressions are to be excluded.

PS: Reduce the weight of the ideological component.

PCP: There is no such thing as a "non-ideological" and "neutral" constitution. Opposed to the substitution of the democratic-constitutional compromise, in favor of the reverse.

PRD:

CD: Elimination of the fundamentally socialist objectives and principles.

#### **Irreversibility or Nonirreversibility of Nationalization**

PSD: Abolishment of article 82, which stipulates, in paragraph 1, that "all nationalizations effected after 25 April 1974 shall be irreversible acquisitions of the working classes."

PS: One of the points about which a concrete decision has not yet been made.

PCP: Yes to irreversibility. Free reversals would violate the provision of article 250, line f.

PRD:

CDS: Opposition to the principle of irreversibility and freedom for private enterprise.

#### **Powers of the President of the Republic**

PSD: Must be elected by all Portuguese citizens, and not merely by voters residing in and counting in the census on national territory, thus providing the opportunity of direct vote for the emigrants.

PS: Essentially the same.

PCP: It is not necessary to reconfigure the statute of the President of the Republic.

PRD:

CDS: National referendum when solicited by the Government or by the National Assembly.

#### **Local Power**

PSD: The Municipal Chamber shall become the executive collegiate body of the community, with at least half plus one of the elected seats falling to the party winning the greatest number of votes.

PS: The idea the president of the Chamber no longer be the vote leader on the party winning the most votes is not acceptable.

PCP: Opposed to the distortion of proportional representation in the formation of the municipal executive bodies and the artificial creation of absolute majorities.

PRD:

CDS: System of majority balloting for the election of the executive bodies.

#### **Motion for Constructive Censure**

PSD: Not acceptable, on the grounds that it would reduce the powers of the President of the Republic.

PS: One of the wagers of the socialists.

PCP: Aberrant distortion in the equilibrium of the system of power, with rigidification of the formation of the governments and amputation of the powers of the President of the Republic.

PRD:

CDS: Does not constitute a part of the plans.

#### **Agrarian Reform**

PSD: Abolishment of the concept of agrarian reform, as well as the cooperatives for production, purchasing, sales, transformation and services, and even the UCP's.

PS: Changes in the terminology.

PCP: Inherent in the Portugal of April. No to the restoration of latifundio.

PRD:

CDS: Elimination of the section.

#### **Minister of the Republic for the Autonomous Regions**

PSD: Keep the post but with reduced powers. Anticipates the exoneration of the Minister of the Republic at the time of the demission of the Prime Minister.

PS: Remain the same.

PCP: In favor of the constitutional statute of the autonomous regions. Suppression or elimination of the post of Minister of the Republic is unacceptable.

PRD:

CDS: Maintain the post.

#### Strike and "Lock Out" (Workers' Commissions)

PSD: Reduce the rights and powers of the workers' commissions, limited to anticipating that the commissions "declare themselves" on certain questions to be made explicit in the law. Strikes to be regulated, and "lock outs" prohibited.

PS: "Lock Outs" shall continue to be prohibited.

PCP: No to the elimination of the constitutional statute of the right to strike. Maintain the prohibition on "lock outs". Strengthen the rights of the workers' commissions.

PRD:

CDS: The "lock out" will no longer be prohibited and strikes shall not inhibit the provision of minimum services.

#### Health (Abortion)

PSD: Maintain the universal and general nature of a National Health Service, but eliminate the concept of no fees, emphasizing privatization of these activities. The question of legalization of abortion should be put to referendum.

PS: No changes anticipated.

PCP: In favor of the National Health Service, reject the watering-down of its constitutional functions. Maintain the constitutional framework. Reject the retrograde proposals attacking maternity as a free and conscious act.

PRD:

CDS: It falls to the State to organize a National Health Service, and to discipline and finance the private structures. Prohibit abortion.

#### Social Communication (Television)

PSD: The organization and fiscalization of social communication belonging to the State are to be regulated by law, in such a form as to guarantee the independence of those media and access to various currents of opinion. Eliminate the Council of Social Communication. The state guarantees a public radio and television service, with the other means of production being of private property.

PS: Guarantee of a public audiovisual service. Opening to private initiative.

PCP: Rejection of the solutions which subvert in favor of big capital the rules defending freedom of expression, pluralism and national independence, maintenance and strengthening of the Council of Social Communication.

PRD:

CDS: The Council of Social Communication shall no longer have a constitutional mandate; end the state TV monopoly.

#### Referendums

PSD: The referendum shall be resorted to in areas of national interest.

PS: Yes, when decided upon by the sovereign bodies.

PCP: No to the approval of mechanisms which, under any form, have the stamp of a plebiscite and offer possibilities for antidemocratic manipulation.

PRD:

CDS: To be introduced as one of the forms of exercising political power.

13026/7310

## SWEDEN

#### VPK Chairman Werner Presents Vision of Communist Sweden

36500015a Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET  
in Swedish 6 Oct 87 p 8

[Article by Kenneth Ahlborn/TT and Mats Johansson/TT: "Lars Werner's Vision of Sweden's Future. Unique Communist Republic"]

[Text] If Lars Werner were to get 60 percent of the votes in the parliamentary election, the future Swedish Communist republic would look like this:

All natural assets, as well as the large export companies, would be owned by the "community", that is by the state, local authorities, or by a cooperative.

On the whole, we would have the same foreign policy as now and remain free from alliances. The parliament with all its parties would be the same. The possibility would exist, at each election, to vote freely against Lars Werner, who would then transfer the governing power to the non-Socialist groups.

This would be a unique Communism, but then the history of Sweden in the 1900's is unique, according to a Swedish Central News Agency (TT) interview with the VPK-(Left Wing Communist Party)leader.

He says that a record-long interval of peace and a strongly developed capitalism, which has paid for great reforms, are the reasons why the Swedish worker is not a revolutionary.

[Question] Why does Communism always seem to mean restrictions of personal freedom?

[Answer] Mainly because of the development in the Soviet Union. The revolution in 1917 was a life or death struggle. After that there was a civil war with foreign troops in the country.

Then the country had to defend itself against the German Fascism. New restrictions were added, which were thought to be temporary.

There is no excuse for having continued the system once it was no longer necessary. That is why Communism is associated with lack of freedom.

#### Environment Party Non-Socialist

Lars Werner has contrary expectations of the Environment Party as a parliamentary party, compared to Bengt Westerberg.

"I am surprised that the Liberal Party is attacking it so strongly, considering that the Environment Party (MP) is basically a non-Socialist party.

"Individuals in the party might impress me by their commitment but not the party as a whole. I would not rule out the possibility that it will become a parliamentary party."

The bridge across the Oresund Strait will become a difficult question for the Social Democrats, just like nuclear power once was, according to Werner.

"If they concentrate on a highway bridge, their new environmental image will lose all credibility. We want them to investigate the possibility of making an underwater railroad tunnel instead."

Werner has his eye on the Minister of Communications, Sven Hulterstrom.

"He has no plans at all for the traffic-political questions, no visions about the traffic and he is one of the reasons why the Social Democrats have no credibility in environmental questions. He is actually in favor of Scanlink and the bridge, but he is trying to hide it."

#### Rapid Liquidation

One of the party's most important requirements, besides abolishing the sales tax on food and "control over company profits," is a progressive uniform local tax, i.e. a way to regulate the large differences in local taxes which exist in Sweden.

"It is unbelievable that there can be an 18,000 kronor difference in tax between someone living in the poorest community in Norrland and someone living in the richest one in Stockholm."

[Question] After we close down the nuclear power stations in 2010, will we still live in high-technology prosperity?

[Answer] Of course, but without the worst aspects. I believe that natural gas will constitute the quickest means of replacing nuclear power, and we ought to negotiate with the appropriate countries now. The sooner we can begin to liquidate nuclear power, the sooner new kinds of energy and technicians will be forced to appear.

[Question] It has been said that a too rapid liquidation will force a dependency on forms of energy that we do not want, fossil fuels and coal, for instance.

[Answer] That might happen but only during the transition period. The Conservative Party's talk of shocking increases in the cost of electricity, of closings of industrial plants and other things is a disaster theory.

12339

#### Poll: Environment Party Surpasses Center Party

##### SDP Continues Slow Decline

36500015b Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish  
18 Oct 87 p 10

[Article by Dick Ljungberg: "Environment Party Larger Than Center"]

[Text] For the first time, the Environment Party is larger than the Center Party. The Conservative Party strengthens its position as the largest non-Socialist party, and the Social Democrats continue slowly but surely to lose ground.

That is the content of DN/IMU's (DAGENS NYHETER/The Institute for Market Research) first post-summer voter barometer, which was made during the period of September 14-October 7. 898 interviews were done in people's homes. The rise of the Conservatives and the decline of the Center are statistically proven changes since the last poll in May.

#### U.S.A. Trip

During the polling period, the Social Democratic party-congress took place with a great amount of publicity. Shortly before, Ingvar Carlsson had returned from his trip to the United States. The spy, Bergling, was still incarcerated at the Norrkoping institution.

**Results in October with the changes from May in parentheses:**

Social Democrats 40.0 (-0.5), Conservatives 21.0 (+3.0), Center 8.0 (-3.0), Liberals 15.0 (-1.5), Left-Wing Communists 4.5 (+0.5), Christian Democratic Coalition 1.5 (+1.0), Environment Party 10.0 (+0.5) percentage units. 5.0 percent cannot or do not want to disclose their "best party."

**Small Difference**

In the May poll, the three non-Socialist parliamentary parties, for the first time since early spring of 1986, became somewhat larger than the Socialist bloc. The latter is now somewhat larger with 44.5 against the non-Socialist 44.0, but that is a difference which is within the margins of statistical error.

**Losing Ground**

The Social Democrats received record-high figures after the assassination of Olof Palme in February of 1986, 46.5 percent in April of 1986, but since then the party has been losing ground in eight IMU-polls in a row. Now it is on its way down below the 40-percent mark again, as it was before Palme's death when the party, in the February poll of 1986, was down to 38 percent.

**Election Results**

The governing party is now way below the election result of 1985 which was 44.7 percent. Even in the longterm trend, a sliding average of the seven latest polls, the Social Democrats are below the election figures, that is 42.3 percent.

Since the poll, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson has had to deal with the Bergling affair and the government has also received criticism for its actions in regards to the kidnapped Swedes in Angola. Its strength is still that the Swedish economy is going well. And Ingvar Carlsson probably has more credibility among the Swedes than his party.

**Turbulence**

This time the turbulence within the non-Socialist bloc is unusually strong. Since the spring of 1986, the Conservatives and the Liberals have fought over which of them is the largest non-Socialist party. The Conservatives have consistently been around 17-18 percent but have suddenly taken a jump up to 21 percent. For the first time since the election, they are close to the result then, which was 21.3 percent.

The increase came just in time for the Conservative Party meeting in Malmo, which starts on Friday. In the longterm trend the party has 18.1 percent.

The Liberal Party capered upward even in the IMU poll after the election sensation in 1985, when it received 12.4 percent. Today's figure 15.0, is considerably higher than the election result, but the Liberal Party has been losing ground in IMU polls during 1987. The Liberal Party's national meeting, which began shortly after the polling period, was overshadowed by the Bergling affair. In the longterm trend the party has a high 17.1 percent.

The Center Party is still the problem child of the non-Socialist camp. Since the 1985 election, the party has been parked around 10.1 percent in the IMU poll, its poor result then. The increase of 2 percent in May to 11 percent, considering today's result of 8 percent, seems to have been an accidental occurrence. The Center party has not been this low since the beginning of 1986. In the longterm trend the party remains exactly even with the election result, 10.1 percent.

Before the 1988 election, the non-Socialists would like to appear somewhat united, in order to gain credibility as a government alternative to the Social Democrats. If a party becomes too small, like the Center, the prospects for cooperation become more difficult. The Center is forced to profile itself harder. New tensions may appear within the non-Socialist bloc during the general policy debate in the parliament on Wednesday.

**New Record**

The Environment Party, the Greens, is now advancing in the IMU poll for the sixth time in a row and 10 percent is of course a new record. In the 1985 election, the party had only 1.5 percent, the breakthrough came after the Chernobyl accident in 1986. Now nobody can deny that the Greens are serious candidates for the parliament in 1988.

In connection with the May poll, IMU particularly asked voters in the various parties about their tendency to vote and it was shown that the Environment Party sympathizers were planning on voting to an extent which would assure seats in the parliament.

**VPK Stable**

The Left-Wing Communist Party is the most stable party in the IMU polls, it is consistently dangerously near the 4-percent bar to the parliament.

The Christian Democratic Coalition Party advanced with one percent to 1.5, which ought to cause bright future speculations from the incurable optimist, Alf Svensson.



Voter Opinion

|  |       | May   | April | March | Longterm<br>Trend<br>Sep<br>1987 |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------------------------|
|  | 1987  | 1987  | 1987  | 1987  | 1987                             |
| Number of interviews                     | 898   | 908   | 941   | 922   | —                                |
| Percent of them with<br>party sympathy   |       |       |       |       |                                  |
| Social Democrats                         | 40.0  | 40.5  | 42.5  | 42.5  | 42.3                             |
| Conservatives                            | 21.0  | 18.0  | 18.0  | 17.0  | 18.1                             |
| Center                                   | 8.0   | 11.0  | 9.0   | 10.5  | 10.1                             |
| Liberals                                 | 15.0  | 16.5  | 17.5  | 17.5  | 17.1                             |
| VPK                                      | 4.5   | 4.0   | 4.5   | 5.0   | 4.3                              |
| Christian Democrats                      | 1.5   | 0.5   | 1.0   | 0.5   | 1.0                              |
| Environment Party                        | 10.0  | 9.5   | 7.5   | 6.0   | 6.7                              |
| Others                                   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0   | 1.0   | —                                |
|  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | —                                |
| Cannot/will not<br>disclose "best party" | 5.0   | 4.0   | 5.5   | 4.5   | —                                |

The interviews took place during the period of 14 Sep-7 Oct 1987.

The two main changes in this poll concern the decline of the Center and the rise of the Conservatives, both changes are statistically correct.

Other changes between the last and the next to the last poll fall within the margins of statistical error.

Changes between two consecutive polls should be interpreted with great care, if they are not indicated as statistically significant. Instead trends for the last three polls or differences from the longterm trend should be noted.

The statistical margin of error for a single poll is about 3% for the Social Democrats, about 2.5% for the Liberals and the Conservatives, about 1.9% for the Center and 0.7-1.5% for the other parties.

The longterm trend is estimated as a sliding average for the last seven polls.

The poll was taken among nationally representative Swedish citizens between the ages of 18-74. The interviews took place in the home. The question asked was: "Which party do you feel is best?" The preference was expressed with the help of ballots.

COPYRIGHT: DAGENS NYHETER and IMU

Conservative Party Views Extremists

36500015b Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish  
18 Oct 87 p 10

[Article by Carin Stahlberg]

[Text] The Conservatives do not want any members of right-wing extremist organizations in their party. That is why certain names have been closely examined at the request of Party Secretary Per Unckel.

"It is inconsistent to be a member of the Conservatives while also belonging to EAP (extension unknown) or the Swedish Party, for instance. I always check on such things. If that should be the case, the person in question is expelled from our party," says Per Unckel, party secretary of the Conservative Coalition Party.

He has asked Carl Johan Kjellander, formerly employed by the Conservatives, to check whether certain persons, who are engaged in EAP, also have ties with the Conservatives.

"This information came to light during the course of the Palme investigation but so far I have not found anything," says Per Unckel.

Own Rosters

The Conservatives base their investigation on statements made by the "suspected" person himself about whether he or she belongs to the Swedish Party and the Conservatives, for instance.

"Or we may have been informed by someone else, saying that the person in question is connected to organizations of this type."

Reports that Kjellander has checked the membership roster of the organization "Keep Sweden Swedish" (BSS) and the Nordic National Party are denied by Unckel.

Infiltration

"No, we can only check our own rosters. We do not have access to any other membership rosters. It is correct, however, that a person who is a member of the Swedish Party today was formerly a member of the Conservatives for a short period of time."

The reason why the Conservatives are now checking their own ranks is not only the reports that circulated in connection with the Palme investigation.

"We are doing it because these organizations have made it known that they are systematically trying to infiltrate the parties. If that should be the case, we are very quick on the trigger. The person in question is expelled," says Per Unckel.

As an example, he mentions a couple of members of the Conservative Youth Alliance (MUF) who were expelled some years ago. They belonged to both MUF and the Democratic Alliance. Something which is considered inconsistent by the party leadership.

"Investigations of double membership have been made before and can be made again at any time. However, we do not check on people systematically and no other groups but the EAP type have been checked," says Per Unckel.

#### **Conservatives Gain Three Points**

*36500015b Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish  
18 Oct 87 p 10*

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Increased Non-Socialist Tension After Decline of Center Party"]

[Text] What is the position of social democracy among the voters? That question is automatic after the first fall IMU-poll.

With the eighth poll in a row, IMU shows a decline for the government party, this time with half a percentage unit to 40 percent. In August SIFO (Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research) gave the Social Democrats close to 46 percent.

The variation in the trend might be due to polling methods. Since shortly before the previous election SIFO uses both in-home and telephone interviews.

There is no actual way of showing how such a mixed polling method works. It is natural to imagine that many people are reluctant to indicate party sympathies over the telephone. They have no way of checking the credentials of the caller, it might be a neighbor having fun.

Furthermore it might also be the case that socialist voters are more inclined to talk about their party allegiance, whereas it is anon-Socialist virtue to keep your party sympathy a secret. If this is true, it is obvious that there should be a social democratic surplusrepresentation in the SIFO poll.

IMU still visits the homes with ballots and that method must, in principle, be viewed as more accurate, even though the selection is smaller. It gives considerably greater guarantees of secrecy than telephone interviews and the dropout cases are fewer.

Only an election can give a better picture of how accurate a mixed polling method, such as SIFO's, is in relationship to the actual voter opinion.

Otherwise it is worth noting that the Environment Party increased again, this time to ten percent. It will probably not be until the end of the year that we can get a more realistic idea of how good the Environment Party's chances really are of managing the four-percent bar.

As far as the non-Socialists are concerned, the changes are great. The Conservatives advance with three percentage units and the Center declines with as much. It will increase the tensions within the non-Socialist bloc and that is a detriment to cooperation. Even the Liberal Party is declining, but that figure may have to be viewed as a normal fluctuation.

#### **Paper Views Contrasting Polls**

*36500015b Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish  
18 Oct 87 p 10*

[Editorial: "Social Democratic Government After All"]

[Text] Today's IMU voter opinion poll, the first of its kind since May, serves a useful purpose: it makes us all less sure that SIFO is right.

IMU's result differs markedly from SIFO's in two respects. First as regards the position between the two blocs, which according to IMU is even. As we know, SIFO showed a definite predominance of the current government bloc. Then it is a question of voter sympathies for the Social Democrats. SIFO has shown them as around 46 percent, while IMU shows a level around 40 as well as declining eight polls in a row.

Even if IMU happens to be closer to the truth, the government will probably remain social democratic. The figure for the Environment Party shows that they will have enough to gain entry into the parliament. Considering the interest in the environment that characterized the Social Democratic congress, it can practically be assumed that Ingvar Carlsson will remain as prime minister if the Greens are the ones to tip the scale.

It is possible the IMU's low socialist figures can be explained by the Environment Party having pulled quite a few voters who otherwise would show socialist sympathies. Whether this will hold true on election day is more than anyone can say today. Results from both IMU and SIFO seem to indicate that the Environment Party retains the element of surprise in relationship to conventional know-it-all. In addition to the Green dimension, which has entered deeply into the Swedish people's hearts, there are also the effects of all the affairs and the governmental quarrels, which might favor a party that voices distrust against the establishment (unless the non-Socialists manage to raise the temperature of and the interest in the debate between the government and the opposition by these tactics.).

In regard to the positions within the non-Socialist bloc, SIFO and IMU are basically in agreement. The Conservative Party is clearly the largest. The Center is having difficulties making a come-back, especially as long as the Environment Party manages to capture a great deal of the Green opinion in the large cities. The Liberal Party seems to have a slow but clearly sinking

tendency, at least up until the national convention and the strengthening of the party's actions in opposition which have been noted since then.

With eleven months left until the election, a lot seems open and uncertain. What will be the repercussions of the Bergling-affair, which seems to have infuriated the Swedish people? What will happen with the inflation and the wage negotiations, over which the government seems to have little control?

Nobody knows nowadays how politically stable the Swedish people are until the crucial day: election day.

**Center's Internal Struggle Blamed**

*36500015b Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish  
19 Oct 87 p 2*

[Editorial Roundup: "Active Leadership"]

[Text] In a commentary on the decline of the Center Party in SIFO and IMU, the SKANSKA DAGBLADET feels that the suggestion that the Center has

difficulty in disseminating its message is not enough of an explanation:

Rather it is a result of there being conflicting interests within the movement and that leads to uncertainty on the part of the voters concerning the party profile and direction. The party leadership has certainly been fairly active after the meeting in early summer, but even the party leadership, as well as other representatives of the Center movement, have found it difficult to clarify what is specific about the Center's message. Perhaps the party leadership ought to assume a more active role in leading the party and less acting as representatives for the sometimes conflicting interests and trying for a mutual adjustment between them.

12339

## DENMARK

### Columnist: Defense Compromise Can Be 'Bought Too Dear'

36130016 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE  
in Danish 19 Oct 87 p 12

[Commentary by 'Monitor'; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] "Whether we get a sensible defense compromise this year will depend mainly on whether the government becomes involved in a direct dialogue with Svend Auken, who has the necessary insight. He must now be made to show that he is thinking in a responsible and national way and that he can engage his party in one of his own areas," in the opinion of 'Monitor.'

At this time people are gearing up for a resumption of the talks on a new defense compromise. Of course the new people who came in after the election must have a chance to find out about things, but the time is drawing near if an agreement is to be reached before the budget is approval and the current Defense Act expires at the end of the year.

Here in the second or third round of the defense talks there is reason to ask if it is worth working for a defense agreement at all; whether external and internal conditions have changed since the last round in the spring; and whether the government can do something now to reach an agreement with the Social Democrats.

Not all the many defense compromises we have seen in this country have been equally good. Looking back we can see that some defense compromises, for example those in the period between the wars, were totally misleading in relation to the country's security situation at the time.

Several compromises have shown signs of straddling between irreconcilable viewpoints. Very few defense arrangements have actually been carried out when their well-formulated goals had to be put into practice. Often politicians in particular have postponed problems. There have also been cases, for example in both 1980 and 1983-84, when one of the parties to the compromise abandoned it along the way and implemented extraordinary savings cuts single-handedly.

Thus defense agreements are not sacrosanct and all they mean is that annual limits must be approved as part of the national budget and the individual appropriations must be endorsed by the Finance Committee, just like appropriations for other ministries.

But defense agreements have a symbolic significance. Partly as a signal to other countries that there is broad agreement, partly as a sign—especially to the politicians themselves—that the problems have been swept under

the rug for a while. The agreements have put a damper on open debate, but they have also lessened the public's interest in and knowledge of defense issues.

While one out of every two student has an idea about American nuclear strategy, for example, detailed knowledge of Danish defense is uncommon. Defense has become abstract, no more concrete for many people than a NATO membership fee—which could just as well take the form of sending in a monthly payment.

Whether Danish defense agreements have benefited the defense system, whether they have provided the stability that has been claimed, remains a question when we compare ourselves with other countries. But at any rate they have been a solid tradition and a political convenience that would take courage to dispense with.

What has happened since the talks bogged down in the spring? For they did bog down because they were referred to Folketing's Defense Committee, which has not been the place where agreements were concluded for many years.

In the international area the move toward an American-Russian understanding on medium-range missiles has come another step closer to an agreement. But there are still two entirely different interpretations of what this will mean as far as Denmark is concerned.

In the government's opinion it means that the West will become relatively weaker and this must be offset by conventional forces in West Europe. For the Social Democrats the main point is that there should be no interference with the superpower signals on arms reduction in the form of a Danish arms buildup. But the Social Democrats can also see the point that both an American arms reduction in Europe and the need for a more independent European status call for a strengthening of what is known as the European column in NATO.

They must also be able to see that the column must be strong at the base if it has to go without the protection of a nuclear umbrella, regardless of whether it is American or English-French.

On this point there does not seem to be any disagreement between the government and the Social Democratic parties in northwestern Europe of the kind the Danish Social Democrats have put so much emphasis on in the area of nuclear policy. These parties have not expressed any wish for a conventional disarmament of Denmark—perhaps partly because they do not have enough imagination to see how this could possibly be done.

The domestic policy situation has only partly changed since the spring. The Social Democrats are still the only ones with whom an agreement can be reached, the

cooperation patterns in Folketing are still uncertain and it will not be until the debate on the budget that we will get an idea of how long it will be before we have another election.

The politicians have also been cautious about making statements on defense and some of them have probably regretted that they did not get things over with in the spring when there might have been a chance of reaching an agreement.

New people will now be leading the negotiations. A new and unfettered defense minister has been given the always unenviable task of concluding an objectively unsatisfactory compromise. The tendency of the last 15 years toward an increase in the number of Social Democratic members who are skeptical about defense has certainly not been halted, but it may be of greater importance that the party's new leader is one of the people with the best factual background in the area of defense and security. If as the newly-elected leader of the party he supports a solution, it will be impossible for the party to repudiate him and still hang together.

What are the government's options in this area? It cannot stand rigidly behind its original opening bid to the very end. In that case there will be no agreement. Nor can it give in totally and accept the initial Social Democratic policy which would lead to a continuation of declining defense levels, a new Danification debate among our allies and the erosion of party credibility among its core voters. A compromise is necessary.

Some government politicians, for example Erhard Jacobsen, are already making their contribution. As long as there were plans for making general cuts—in the face of strong Social Democratic protests—it was hard to make a case for real growth in the defense budget. With the open-handedness that seems to characterize the government after the election, it will be easier to get people to swallow the greatly needed restoration of defense funding. It does not involve very large sums compared with the amounts that are currently being juggled with in the 1988 budgets.

It is more doubtful that the foreign minister can help. The government cannot sell out its security policy standpoints in return for more money for defense without seriously hampering the foreign minister. Nor would that help credibility at home and abroad.

On the other hand the government can make a move in the budget area. Since last winter this seems to have been of more concern to the Social Democratic leadership than matters of substance. The zero solution has been the major demand and this is not so strange in view of the fact that neither the public nor most politicians are interested in the structure of the defense system. But if it is a question of money, there are always possibilities for compromise.

One possibility is that they will meet approximately in the middle, i.e. reach an agreement on a real growth of 200-400 million kroner. Actually there is some tradition for this in negotiations in recent years and it is not so hard to explain to one's supporters. Another possibility is that the government will accept the zero solution in principle—with improved and realistic price-index regulation—but that in addition there would be an agreement on extraordinary appropriations to make up for the big deficiencies in materiel that go all the way back to the 1950's and 1960's. Most people could also understand that. A third possibility could be that the government accepts the zero solution for 1988 in return for bigger increases in later years. That would also be a partial victory for each side. The value of such alternatives depends of course on the durability of the compromise but the labor market's 4-year contracts with a possibility for renegotiation might be used as a model here.

Defense proponents will probably say that none of the alternatives will solve the economic problems of defense—but they will prevent them from becoming substantially larger. In the negotiating situation it is decisive that they give the Social Democratic leadership good arguments for maintaining the tradition of compromise and the ensuing direct insight into defense via the 11-man committee or something similar.

But if the government cannot come up with anything that resembles a reasonable compromise, the possibility must not be ignored that no compromise at all will be reached in 1987.

The government does not have to accept the premise that the responsibility and thus the time pressures rest solely on it. With the Social Democratic statements we have been hearing—including some from Anker Jorgensen—there should be no risk that the Social Democrats will not vote for price-index regulation of defense appropriations in the 1988 budget too. If the government cannot get the Social Democrats to go any farther this time around, there is no reason to agree on a compromise. Perhaps the prospects will look better later on when a clearer picture can be formed of the reactions of the West European countries to the superpower negotiations.

Whether we get a sensible defense compromise this year depends mainly on whether the government becomes involved in a direct dialogue with Svend Auken, who has the necessary insight. He must now be made to show that he is thinking in a responsible and national way and that he can engage his party in one of his own areas. If he is not yet ready to do this it would be better for everyone to wait. And the military is used to that.

## FINLAND

### Officials Cite Shortcomings in Civil Defense Alarms, Shelters

36170010c Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish  
21 Oct 87 p3

[Article: "Residents of Helsinki Did Not React to Test Alarm, Sound of New High Power Alarms Still Not Sufficient"]

[Text] The new high power alarms tested on Tuesday for the first time were a disappointment. One could not make out the sound of the alarm above the noise of the traffic.

According to Niilo Kohonen, civil defense chief for Helsinki, the alarm signal could not be heard in Lauttasaari, North Helsinki, the more eastern part of Helsinki, the city center, and it was not sufficiently loud on Mannerheim, Runeberg, Pohjoisranta, or Sornais Ranta streets, which are heavy traffic streets.

In addition, the signal was not heard by people who were inside buildings when the alarm was sounded.

"But we now, at least, know where and how many new alarms are needed," says Niilo Kohonen.

There are only 11 of the new high power alarms, which were now tested for the first time in the city. The need for additional alarms will be half again as great.

"In any event, these new alarms have a considerably louder sound in comparison with the older high power alarms."

### Schoolchildren Participated in Test

The residents of Helsinki had an opportunity on Tuesday to familiarize themselves with seven of the city's largest civil defense shelters in honor of Civil Defense Day.

A group of schoolchildren from Etu-Toolo measured their "crisis time home" with their looks in the cave shelter which can accommodate 6000 people and is located next to Temppeliaukio Church on Nervanderi Street.

At 11:30 am, the city's 11 high power alarms sounded for a minute at 2-second intervals. Those who knew about Civil Defense Day in advance knew that the beeping sound meant the new general alarm signal. The alarm signal was not heard by those who were in a hurry.

"Indeed, the sound of the alarm was so weak that no one would have paid any attention to it unless they knew to expect it in advance," said Tyyne Pyykonen and Aino Veijola, who had hurried to prepare food at the shelter on Nervanderi Street.

Timo Tahtinen, a student from Etu-Toolo, also complained that the sound of the high power alarms sounded more like a wheezing. "The alarm could not be heard at all in the classroom."

According to him, it is doubtful that anyone would know to go to a civil defense shelter if the alarm were sounded at night.

### "One Could Stay Here A Day"

Heikki Sahrakorpi, a student from Taivallahti, showed the cave shelter to his classmates as if he were the owner.

"I have been here many times before. Our parking stall is here, disclosed Heikki.

How long could you stay in this familiar parking place if you had to move in for a while?

"A day — at the most," he thought.

Heikki's classmate, Aleks Heino, was able to say that one could stay a week in a civil defense shelter in an emergency situation.

"If the alarm were to go off, I would take along a change of clothing and some food. One would not be able to get out of here in a day."

Both boys praised the necessity of the civil defense exercise with a twinkle in the corner of their eyes: "Especially, when one does not have to sit in the classroom."

### Shelter Will Not Be Found for Everyone, Civil Defense Shelters As Storehouses for Scrap

According to the civil defense statute, every five-unit apartment building, at least, must have a civil defense shelter and a relevant civil defense plan.

On paper there are enough shelters for nearly everyone in Helsinki since there are approximately 4000 shelters in the city and they can accommodate a total of 553,000 people.

According to Paula Stark, training secretary of the Civil Defense Association, the situation in practice is not as good. Several shelters in housing units are being used as storehouses for scrap or places to park bicycles. A considerable number of the city's 30 cave shelters function as parking lots or warehouses.

"According to civil defense plans, the cave shelters must be emptied and vacated within 24 hours after an alarm is sounded. Inasmuch as the alarm should come as a complete surprise, the situation will be rather problematical."

Lauttasaari, Laajasalo, and all of North Helsinki, among other places, are without cave shelters at this time.

"The city's decision-makers seem to be showing a green light to the construction of large cave shelters in principle, but since money is needed, more urgent projects can always be found," regrets Stark.

As an example, she mentions Kontula, whose civil defense shelter was completed 25 years after the decision to construct it was made.

10576

**Navy To Purchase English-Made Magnetic Mines**  
*36170010b Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT*  
*in Finnish 27 Oct 87 p 11*

[Article: "English Magnetic Mines for Navy"]

[Text] A small consignment of English magnetic mines has been procured for the Navy. The first mines have already been delivered, but their acceptance for training purposes will take some time.

Soviet magnetic mines, which were acquired in 1983, are presently being used for training. The possibility of acquiring the English mines was explored at that time already.

Magnetic mines react to changes or disturbances which are caused by ships moving in the water. The magnetic field of a ship and changes in pressure or sound disturbances cause a magnetic mine to explode.

10576

**GREECE**

**U.S. Reportedly Aware of 'New Defense Dogma' Ineffectiveness**  
*35210026b Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 9 Nov 87 p 20*

[Article by I VRADYNI correspondent D. Dimas: "And. Papandreou's 'Defense Doctrine' Exists Only on Paper. Rhetoric for Internal Consumption"]

[Text] Washington, Monday—As the negotiations get under way on the bases, the fate of which the Government has connected directly—and the official opposition has applauded this—with the degree to which they serve Greek national interests vis-a-vis Turkey, it is becoming clear that the gap between the Prime Minister's words and actions toward our neighbor and ally has created serious problems of credibility and has considerably undermined in advance the necessary gains which it is natural to seek from such sensitive negotiations.

However, Washington and our other allies (including Turkey) are aware that despite Papandreou's sharp rhetoric on the Turkish danger—which was accompanied by the "new defense doctrine" in 1984—the redeployment of Greek armed forces "was never disturbed [as published]."

Naturally this contradiction has strengthened the well-known American view that Turkey does not constitute a danger to Greece and it is understandable that those planning the U.S. strategy and tactics for the base negotiations were much influenced by this observation.

Thus what is for the Greek side perhaps the most important aspect of the Greek-American negotiations, an aspect to which the Prime Minister theoretically attributes the appropriate significance, "is viewed in a different light" by the American negotiating team.

The basic conclusion which emerges from this important analysis is that, as political observers emphasize, the "new defense doctrine" exists only "on paper" and is merely "rhetoric" used repeatedly by the Greek Prime Minister to arouse and disorient public opinion in pursuit of his own narrow political purposes.

From information received and from VRADYNI's subsequent conversations with allied circles in Washington and Brussels, it emerges that Papandreou has carried out only "cosmetic changes" towards implementing the new defense doctrine, purely and simply in order to give weight to the impressions he was seeking to create domestically.

Specifically, it emerges that Papandreou "took measures which merely give the impression of substance" because the redeployment of Greek defensive forces called for by the new doctrine never took place.

In the case at hand, it can be emphasized that creating the Ministry of the Aegean (lacking any substance and mission), establishing the Aegean Military Command, strengthening civil defense in the Aegean, and other actions of a similar type were merely "cosmetic" changes.

A typical comment from allied analysis is that "in reality the deployment of Greek forces against the Warsaw Pact countries was never disturbed." To reinforce this point, the commentator added that "the best equipped and trained Greek forces remain in their traditional positions." In light of this, the judgement is that Greek defense plans are "totally coordinated" with allied strategy and its broader goals in the region.

12593

### Chemical Warfare Equipment Purchase Bids Questioned

35210026c Athens PONDIKI in Greek 6 Nov 87 pp 8-9

[Article: "Is It Possible?"]

[Text] There was yet another parameter to the Louvaris case: it brought into the light of day a competition to supply the Army with 135,000 masks and 270,000 filters for chemical warfare (NBC war) which was held recently and has a (curious!) history of its own. This is that history:

#### It Was Announced Four Times!

Each time the terms changed and stipulations were added which either made it difficult for many firms to participate or met the specifications (and served the interests) of only certain firms.

The proof of all this? The texts of the last two competitions which PONDIKI has in its possession and which (almost a year apart) contain such contradictory stipulations and terms for the same object that one very reasonably begins to suspect that some "outside hand" modified them.

The third (next-to-last) competition was announced (no. 210) on 10 September 1986 and the announcement was signed by the then subdirector of the Procurement Directorate of the Army General Staff, Brigadier General D. Milidonis.

The fourth (last) competition (no. 184) was announced on 27 August 1987 and the announcement was signed by the present subdirector of the Procurement Directorate of the Army General Staff, Brigadier General Mikh. Vryonis.

What are the differences between the two competitions that arouse questions? Read on:

1. The "requirements" section of the September 1986 announcement reads, in part: "The supplier must declare in writing and also submit a certificate from the proper agency that the goods will be of domestic manufacture."

In the August 1987 announcement, the "requirement" that the goods be of "domestic manufacture" is dropped and in its place comes the vague proposal (which opens many doors and "back doors"): "The goods shall be new, complete, and of recent Greek manufacture or foreign origin..."

First conclusion: The position of Greek manufacturers was better in the 1986 announcement, whereas the 1987 announcement essentially opens the door to foreign companies (and of course, let us never forget this, to their representatives).

2. The 1986 announcement states the requirement that the Greek Added Value "must average at least 50 percent over the 5 years." More specifically the same announcement states:

"Greek Added Value is the percentage of the total value of each item produced which remains after subtracting all costs of foreign raw materials, semi-manufactured goods, and/or services; profit, and deductions. The Greek Added Value must average at least 50 percent. The bids shall list the annual increase in the Greek Added Value for each item under production."

In contrast, in last August's announcement the 50 percent Greek Added Value ceases to be a "requirement" and is reduced to 35 percent.

Second conclusion: Under last August's terms the Greek Added Value is no longer high and this increases foreign firms' chances.

3. The 1986 announcement states: "The bids must include a specific price for each item in drachmas and not in foreign currency; this absolutely must include deductions per Paragraph 5 above and for possible protection if the company is a Provincial Industry. In the case of a Provincial Industry, the percentage of protection to which it is entitled is specified as well as the Center Price."

In contrast, the last announcement permits bids to be made in foreign currency too. Specifically it states:

"Payment shall be made in drachmas or foreign currency for delivery of goods CIF or free, with or without exemption, in accordance with the stipulations of the goods procurement award decision to be issued by the Agency. Payment shall be made through the issuance of a payment voucher (KhEP) in the name of Accountable Unit and payment of the supplier shall be made by the Financial Administration of the Accountable Unit (651st Base Ordnance Depot) based on the required payment documents."

Right...

Third conclusion: Naturally this chance makes the competition more unequal for Greek firms.

The competition proceeded with these changes and we come to Tuesday (3 November), when:

Three firms were chosen: Tsatsos' Mistral (a sister firm of Kestrel and Masko, which bid 15,657 drachmas per mask), Avon (21,760 drachmas each), and Balco (16,936 drachmas).

Viana (with the lowest bid, 15,131 drachmas) and Olympic Filter were eliminated.



Now the files with the bids approved will be sent to the Procurement Directorate of the Army General Staff. The final decision will be made by a committee chaired by Brigadier General Vetorakis, according to ELEVTHEROTYPIA. Till then, however, we will be waiting for the answer to a "hot" question: why did the terms of the competition change four times? We are all the more curious, of course, since it seems that changes in terms are a common phenomenon, inasmuch as the same "procedure" was followed in yet another competition in which a Tsatsos firm is participating (Kestrel): every so often the terms of the competition would change, always moving in the same direction, making the competition an unequal one for Greek firms.

Naturally we are talking about the competition to supply camouflage netting, the bids for which were turned in on Tuesday (the competition will take place on 10 December). Great is the puzzlement and difficult the answers, but—what can a person do?—we will be waiting!

12593

#### **PYRKAL Affected by New Billing Scandal**

*35210026a Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 6 Nov 87 p 18*

[Article by T. Stamatopoulos and I. Kanoupakis: "Two New Multibillion Drachma Scandals at Larko and PYRKAL [Munitions and Cartridge Company] Revealed Yesterday by New Democracy Deputies"]

[Text] Two new scandals involving billions of drachmas were revealed yesterday in questions put to the Government by ND deputies who denounced a "scheme" by which Larko purchased petroleum and a host of administrative irregularities at PYRKAL.

Details are as follows:

A new scandal has burst over Larko. ND Deputy I. Varvitsiotis put a question to the Minister of Industry in which he noted that transit petroleum was obtained from state-owned EKO for less than indicated on the invoices.

The deputy notes that this was denounced both by workers and by trade-union bodies at Larko but thus far nobody knows how the company management and Government reacted.

In light of this "scheme," Varvitsiotis concluded, the public prosecutor must take action and order an investigation.

Administrative irregularities and omissions involving billions of drachmas were revealed at PYRKAL. Errors were found with duplicate invoices for munitions and this leads to suspicions that tremendous sums were embezzled by the administrator of the 655th AVP [possibly AVYP: Base Ordnance Depot].

This revelation was made yesterday in a question put to the Minister of National Defense by ND Deputies S. Gikas, A. Zaimis, A. Papadongonas, I. Vasileiadis, Kh. Fotopoulos, and Th. Alexiou, who provided the following details:

"Errors have been found in invoices (payable-chargeable), errors in holding duplicate invoices not marked as to original and copy, which means that the cashier could mistakenly have paid the same invoice twice. Existence of PYRKAL invoices for over 2 billion drachmas which are marked "paid" although neither the delivery of goods nor payment has occurred. (Administrative irregularity. If the money is not in the cashier's office, third persons can work with the cashier or others to embezzle it for their own personal gain.)

Irregularities have also been found in carrying out numerous contracts because of late delivery of goods. For contracts from 1981 and 1982 PYRKAL received significant sums in advance payment but still has not made any deliveries. Still not completed are munitions supply contracts from the years 1983, 1984, and 1985, although 80 percent of their value has been received in advance payment and the contractual delivery dates have long passed. Furthermore, for many late munitions deliveries the penalty clauses have not been invoked, presumably through the indulgence of the armed forces agencies involved.

Debts owed to PYRKAL were assigned to the Ethniki Trapeza, although Article 45 of Presidential Decree 785/78 forbids the assignment to third parties of PYRKAL claims deriving from contracts between PYRKAL and the armed forces.

12593

## **PORTUGAL**

#### **Details on Recent 'Jupiter-87' Air Exercises**

*35420015 Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 31 Oct 87 p 4*

[Text] The chief of staff of the Portuguese Air Force [FAP], General Brochado de Miranda, said yesterday at Alter Pedroso (the site of the tactical base of the Jupiter-87 exercises) that "the Air Force is making an investment in its personnel in relation to the technology of the new air assets."

Gen Brochado de Miranda—who was visiting the theater of operations of the exercises and the bases of Monte Real and Tancos—was favorably impressed by the morale of the troops in the face of the bad weather conditions.

The Air Force chief of staff said that the primary objective of these exercises is to train the cadres and also those demobilized personnel who were called up.

He said that the Air Force lacks certain human and air assets needed to carry out the various missions entrusted to it.

Gen Brochado de Miranda stated that the Portuguese Air Force seeks two interceptor squadrons out of the counterpart funds to be paid by the United States in return for the use of the Lajes base in the Azores.

He emphasized that the plans of the Portuguese Air Force include interceptor aircraft and attack aircraft, for use in the defense of Portuguese territory.

Speaking of the A-7 aircraft, he said that they are intended exclusively as attack aircraft and that there were no funds to purchase any other type of aircraft.

The head of the FAP believes that there is now a need to acquire interceptor aircraft, whose role is currently being played by FAP aircraft that are not the most suitable for the purpose.

He emphasized that the Aviocar will be equipped with more sophisticated equipment to enable it more easily to detect foreign vessels that enter the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Portuguese state.

The Air Force chief of staff added that at some future stage, another type of aircraft could be used for this mission.

The Jupiter-87 exercises involve 2,500 Air Force personnel as well as paratroops, and are supported by units of the Portuguese and Dutch navies.

The exercises—which will be concluded on Monday—are taking place throughout Portuguese airspace and in that part of international airspace lying over the ocean up to 200 miles from the coast.

The paratroops are operating in the areas of Alter do Chao (Portalegre, Alegrete, Arronches, Monforte, Avis, and Ponte de Sor) and of Idanha-a-Nova (Monfortinho, Salvaterra do Extremo, Segura, and Zebreira).

As for the forces participating in the exercises, the "Blue Force" is equipped with G-91, A-7-P, C-130, C-212, and FTB 337-G aircraft, together with Allouette-III and SA-330 (Puma) helicopters.

A combat survival exercise for the Air Force bases is being conducted concurrently with the Jupiter-87 exercises, for the purpose of practicing implementation of the respective defense plans and evaluating their respective potentialities.

10992/9604

## GREECE

### Imports, Exports Rise, Balance of Trade Deficit Grows

35210027b Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 7 Nov 87 p 9

[Text] Despite the fact that the current transaction deficit has coincidentally improved, imports increased at a higher rate during the first 9 months of 1987, resulting in a further increase of the balance of trade deficit. However, the inflow from EOK [European Economic Community] and foreign exchange from tourism have saved the situation; as a result the total deficit of the balance of payments appears to be noticeably reduced. Particularly in September, the rate of increase in imports was lower but, despite all this, the trade deficit went up because of fuel purchases.

These developments that once more come to stress that the improvement in the balance of payments was coincidental and that a sudden relapse could be possible if international conditions were to change, are shown in the official data made public yesterday by the Ministry of National Economy. According to this data:

During the 9-month period from January to September compared with the corresponding period in 1986:

1. Imports increased by 20.5 percent while exports increased by 18.7 percent; this resulted in a further increase by 21.7 percent in the balance of trade deficit.

2. The surplus of the balance of invisibles increased by 51.8 percent especially because of a 62.9 percent increase in the inflow from EEC and in the foreign exchange from tourism.

3. As a result of these developments the deficit in the balance of current transactions appears to have decreased by 43.6 percent. In particular, it reached the level of \$770 million, an amount considered satisfactory by the Ministry of National Economy. The total deficit target it had set for 1987 was \$1,250 million.

4. The inflow of capital for the purchase of real estate increased noticeably (by 42.9 percent), while the increase in the inflow of business capital (12 percent) is minimal despite the government contentions of the opposite.

An announcement by the Ministry of National Economy states the following:

The deficit of current transactions was limited in September to \$21 million compared to \$54 million on the corresponding month of 1986. This development is a continuation of the satisfactory results of the recent months and justifies a feeling of optimism about the final outcome of the balance of payments.

During the 9-month period from January to September, the current transactions deficit decreased by 44 percent reaching the \$770 million level compared to \$1,365 million that it was for the corresponding period of 1986. This improvement in current U.S. dollars becomes even more impressive if it is kept in mind that during that same period the U.S. dollar was devalued by 16 percent against the currencies of the major trade partners of Greece.

8193/9604

### Drop in Industrial Production Reported

35210027a Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek  
11 Nov 87 p 9

[Text] Data provided by ESYE show that the industrial production continued to decline in August. The index of industrial production dropped by 0.7 percent in August compared to the same month of 1986. The index of industrial production dropped by 2.9 percent during the 8-month January-August period of this year compared to the same period last year.

Moreover, according to the ESYE data, the average of the indices showed the following development trend during the January-August 8-month period: the General Index of Production of Mines, Industry and Urban Electricity-Gas showed a 2.5 percent decrease; the Index of Mines Production showed a 3.8 percent decrease; and the Index of Urban Electricity-Gas Production showed an increase of 3.6 percent.

8193/9604

## PORTUGAL

### Figures Show Low Rate of Savings

35420016b Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 31 Oct 87 p 10

[Text] With an average savings rate of \$2,512 (more than 300 contos) per capita, Portugal in 1986 stood in 15th place among 17 European countries and in 20th place among 35 countries throughout the world.

These data are contained in the annual statistical survey published yesterday in Geneva by the International Institute of Savings Banks.

In 1985 the average per-capita savings rate in Portugal was \$2,154—\$358 less than in 1986.

In 1986, savings on deposit in financial institutions in Portugal totaled \$25.548 billion, as against \$12.886 billion in 1985.

In 1986, for the first time, Japan surpassed—by a clear margin—the other countries of the world in the category of bank savings, notably with respect to the average savings rate per capital.

The Japanese thereby replaced the Swiss, who had held first place for many years.

As of the end of 1986, the combined total of savings deposits and time deposits (certificates of deposit) in Japanese banking institutions figured out to \$27,303 per capita.

Second place went to Switzerland with \$23,708, followed by Belgium with \$14,555; the FRG with \$12,288; Austria with \$10,200; Denmark with \$10,164; and the United States with \$9,733.

The total of savings on deposit in Japan is \$3,317,025,000,000; the total for the United States is \$2,351,428,000,000.

In Europe, first place in this category is held by the FRG, with a total of \$750,159,000,000 in savings on deposit.

10992/9738

#### January-August Figures Show Export, Trade Deficit Growth

35420016a Lisbon *TEMPO ECONOMICO* in Portuguese 29 Oct 87 p 10

[Report in collaboration with the Foreign Trade Institute of Portugal (ICEP): "Trade Deficit Worsens by 58 Percent From January to August"]

[Text] The data for Portuguese foreign trade covering the period from January to August of 1987 show that the cumulative trade deficit worsened by 58.4 percent compared with the data for the corresponding period of the preceding year. The figures released by the National Statistics Institute [INE] show, however, that exports increased by 19.02 percent, reaching 830 million contos as against the 698 million contos recorded in 1986.

According to data supplied by the INE, the cumulative trade deficit for 1987—through the month of August—was 377.5 million contos, compared to approximately 238 million contos for the same period of the preceding year. (See Table 1)

With reference to the behavior of imports and exports, it should be noted that imports recorded an overall cumulative total of 1.2082 billion contos, representing a 29 percent increase over the figure for the same period in 1986 (936.3 million contos), while exports recorded an overall cumulative total of 830.7 million contos, which when compared to the figure for the corresponding period in 1986—697.9 million contos—shows a less pronounced increase (approximately 19 percent).

The evolution of these indicators caused the proportion of imports covered by exports to record a drop of almost 6 percentage points—68.76 percent in 1987 as against 74.54 percent in 1986.

When the conversion into U.S. dollars is made and compared with the same period of the preceding year, it can be seen that the volume of Portuguese trade recorded increases of 36.8 percent for imports and 26.1 percent for exports, resulting in an increase of 68.1 percent in the trade deficit.

A closer examination of the monthly results shows that the by now traditional reduction in the volume of foreign trade during the month of August occurred once again, with significant declines both in imports and in exports.

Exports proved to be the most affected by the aforementioned decline (down approximately 32.5 percent for the first 7 months of 1987 as against 30.2 percent for the corresponding period of 1986), while imports recorded declines of 33.0 percent in 1986 and 24.6 percent in 1987 when the same basis for comparison was used.

#### Relations With Partner Countries

A country-by-country analysis of the two-way trade leads to the conclusion that for the period under study in 1987, our largest suppliers were the countries of Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which together sold to Portugal a total of 726.2 million contos of merchandise, representing 60.1 percent of the total of all imports.

On the other hand, Portugal's six biggest customers were France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United States, which together bought from Portugal a total of 557.8 million contos of merchandise, representing 67.1 percent of the total of all Portuguese exports.

It will be noted that five of our six biggest suppliers showed up simultaneously on the list of our biggest customers, as they also did in 1986.

For the corresponding period of 1986, the same groups of countries accounted for 57.0 percent (533.8 million contos) of total imports and 63.7 percent (444.4 million contos) of total exports—a fact that indicates an increased concentration of our foreign trade to and from a reduced number of countries.

As for our trade balances, we show the most significant among them in Table 2.

With respect to the trade deficits, special reference is made to the trade balance with the United States, which declined from a deficit of 21.4 million contos in 1986 (70.4 million contos in imports as against 49.0 million contos in exports) to a deficit of 6.4 million contos in 1987 (60.6 million contos in imports and 54.2 million contos in exports), representing—from the Portuguese point of view—an improvement in our trade situation vis-a-vis that country.

With respect to our trade surpluses, we need mention only the balance with the United Kingdom, which recorded a significant decline even though remaining favorable.

#### Relations With the EEC and EFTA

During the period to which these data refer (January through August of 1987), imports from the EEC came to 773.4 million contos (64.0 percent of the total of all imports), representing an increase of 235.2 million contos over the figure (538.2 million contos) for the corresponding period of the previous year—a 43.7 percent increase.

During the same period, exports to the EEC increased from 468.1 million contos in 1986 (67.1 percent of all exports) to 585.2 million in 1987 (70.4 percent of all exports)—an increase of approximately 25 percent, which is more than the increase in total exports (19 percent) for the same period.

As a result of the evolution of the trade figures for this period, the trade deficit with the EEC is, in 1987, considerably larger than the one that prevailed at the corresponding moment in 1986 (188.2 million contos as against 70.1 million, respectively), with the result that the proportion of coverage dropped 11 percentage points (from 87 percent in 1986 to 75.7 percent in 1987).

In the same period, trade with the countries of the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] recorded the following figures: Imports of merchandise from EFTA countries increased from 70.0 million contos in 1986 to 88.1 million contos in 1987 (up 25.9 percent); exports to these countries recorded an increase of 19.5 percent (from 82.4 million contos in 1986 to 98.5 million contos in 1987). The trade balance—which in 1987 (as in 1986) was favorable to Portugal—registered a slight tendency to diminish (down 2 million contos from the figure for 1986). With the trade balance remaining in Portugal's favor, the proportion of coverage remained above 100 percent (declining slightly, from 117.8 percent in 1986 to 111.8 percent in 1987).

Table 1. Overall Results: Total for the Nation (figures in contos [thousands of escudos])

| January to August      | 1985         | 1986         | Trend (N-1)/(N-2) | 1987          | Trend (N)/(N-1) |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Imports (CIF)          | 873,490,108  | 936,267,795  | +7.19             | 1,208,150,687 | +29.04          |
| Exports (FOB)          | 634,949,795  | 697,915,211  | +9.92             | 830,680,841   | +19.02          |
| Balance                | -238,540,312 | -238,352,583 | -0.08             | -377,469,846  | +58.37          |
| Proportion of coverage | 72.69        | 74.54        | —                 | 68.76         | —               |

Source: National Statistics Institute

Table 2. Most Important Trade Balances (figures in millions of contos)

|   |      |
|---|------|
| 1. Deficits of 15 million contos or more:   |      |
| Italy                                       | 79.6 |
| Spain                                       | 70.7 |
| FRG   | 48.8 |
| Japan                                       | 35.7 |
| Egypt                                       | 25.7 |
| Saudi Arabia                                | 19.5 |
| Brazil                                      | 15.0 |
| 2. Surpluses of more than 6 million contos: |      |
| Sweden                                      | 16.7 |
| UK  | 11.6 |
| Denmark                                     | 8.8  |
| Finland                                     | 7.3  |
| Angola                                      | 7.0  |
| Netherlands                                 | 6.4  |

Source: National Statistics Institute

#### TURKEY

##### Money Shortage Halts Work on Urfa Tunnel 35540008b Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Oct 87 p 2

[Report by M. Ali Kapakli]

[Text] Sanliurfa—Work on the Urfa Tunnel, one of the major units of the Southeast Anatolia Project [SAP], has been halted again.

It has been learned that having failed to receive any payments from the government for the last 5 months the contracting firm laid off 500 workers. Begun in 1981, the Urfa Tunnel consists of two 26-kilometer tunnels running in parallel and is known as the largest irrigation tunnel in the world. When completed, the tunnel will channel the water stored behind the Ataturk Dam to the plains of Lower Euphrates and Harran.

The firm building the Urfa Tunnel—which is targeted for completion in 1990—has been forced to stop work periodically because the government has not paid its obligations. Stating that the government has failed to pay an accumulated total of 10 billion Turkish lira over the last 5 months, construction site officials said:

“How long can we continue this work with loans we receive from the banks? Spending money with interest while the government does not pay us the 10 billion Turkish lira it owes us is pushing the company into ruin. We do not know why we are not being paid what we are owed while billions are being spent on the Ataturk Dam.”

#### **Workers Destitute**

While 500 of the 800 workers employed on the Urfa Tunnel project have been laid off because of a shortage of funds, 300 workers have not received any pay for the last 3 months. The workers on the tunnel said: “Why does Ozal, who calls the SAP ‘my project,’ treat the tunnel like a stepchild? We have not been paid for the last 3 months while the workers at Ataturk Dam have been paid regularly.”

9588

END

10

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated. Those from English-language sources are transcribed, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names which are rendered phonetically or transliterated by FBIS/JPRS are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source.

## SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in 8 volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Africa (Sub-Sahara), Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically. Current JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcovers or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. DOD consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate

command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.) For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (703) 527-2368, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.